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REGULATORY TRUST
Rebecca M. Bratspies*

"Trust begins where prediction ends."'

When regulators make decisions in the face of uncertainty, what gives legitimacy
to their decisions? This question arises more and more frequently as globalized
markets and new technologies crash through pre-existingsocial and politicalfault
lines. In the myriad contexts of regulation, the same refrain plays over and
over-governments must make high-stakes regulatory choices that implicate
poorly understood risks. Trust clearly plays a role in facilitating agency
legitimacy, but what is the relationshipbetween law and trust?
While trustworthy regulators may enhance social resilience, uncertainty erodes
public trust and alienates citizens. This grim reality is reflected in declining levels
of trust in government institutions. Loss of trust undermines not only regulatory
effectiveness, but also society's resilience-itscapacity to persevere and even to
thrive in the face of multiple, unpredictable risks.
This Article offers a framework for "regulatory trust"-the unique form of social
trust invoked when regulatory agencies make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. In doing so, it examines what regulatory trust means, why it matters,
and how it can be produced, maintained, and restored. The resultingframework
identifies the key components of regulatory trust and explores means to cultivate
the trust necessary to allow regulatory agencies to govern effectively in the face of
fundamental uncertainty.
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University of Louisville Law, Ethics and Life Sciences Conference, the 2008 University of
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Russell Miller, Julie Goldscheid, Carlos Ball, June Carbone, Andrea McArdle, Allen
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feedback, to librarians Jonathan Saxon, Ricardo Pla, and Kathy Williams for their ready
assistance, and to Pamela Bradford and Laura Mort for very helpful research assistance. I
owe a debt of gratitude to Brian Steinwand at the EPA for providing me with some
otherwise hard-to-locate documents. As always, I am deeply grateful to Naomi Florence
Schulz and Bernard Allen Schulz for their endless patience and support.
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INTRODUCTION
Trust clearly plays a role in the democratic legitimacy of government
decisions, 2 but the relationship between law and trust continues to be ambiguous.
Thinkers have staked out positions at almost every point along the continuum from
"law cannot produce trust"3 to trust requires law.4 Significantly less attention has
been devoted to the role that trust plays in regulatory systems. Nevertheless, trust
is critically important in the regulatory context. Because the complexity and
uncertainty embedded in modem society force regulators to make decisions at the
frontiers of human knowledge, the level of trust (or not) in the regulators making
those decisions helps shape the regulatory process itself.
Ulrich Beck captured this relationship between uncertainty, complexity,
and trust when he wrote about the "unseen side-effects of industrial production"
morphing into "a profound institutional crisis of industrial society itself.",5 Beck
explains that unceasing technological innovation significantly contributes to risk
and uncertainty in modem industrial society by forcing a constant reassessment of
the relationships between scientific knowledge, technology, and public policy.6 In
particular, new technologies underscore a growing divergence between market
incentives and social welfare. As a society, we often turn to regulation to bridge
7
that gap. But, in contexts as diverse as the licensing of agricultural biotechnology,
2.
See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD 67-82 (2002). This idea
dates back to at least de Tocqeville, who articulated the psychological and intellectual link

between trust and liberty.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, SELECTED LETTERS ON POLITICS AND

(R. Boesche ed., 1985); John A. Hall, Trust in Toequeville, 5 POL'Y ORG. &
Soc. 16 (1992). Quoting the Federalist Papers, some argue that the Constitution's design
obviates the need for trust by channeling individual self-interest into collectively beneficial
outcomes. "The constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner
that each may be a check on the other[-]that the private interests of every individual may
be a sentinel over the public rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Certainly the Constitution's structure allows self-interest to
serve as a check on power, but that does not eliminate the need for trust in the system itself
As described later in this Article, there are numerous examples of individual self-interested
behavior that, in the absence of a trusted social system for channeling and checking those
behaviors, fail to maximize public welfare. Moreover, resource and power asymmetries
make it likely that, without social safeguards, certain interests will predictably triumph at
the expense of other interests.
3.
Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2001) (italics
omitted).
4.
Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2001)
(arguing that without the bedrock of legitimizing law, trust on the Internet will not develop).
5.
ULRICH BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION 8 (1994); ULRICH BECK,
ECOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT 38-40 (1995).
6.
See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY
(Mark Ritter trans., Sage Publications 1992) (1986) (describing an expanding
unpredictability rooted in the interactions of technology, nature, and society as a primary
source of perceived vulnerability.); see also ADAM SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 7-8
(1997).
7.
Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating
Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 393, 396-97 (2007)
[hereinafter Bratspies, Some Thoughts].
SOCIETY 115
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the approval of new drugs or oversight of new financial instruments, 9 the same
refrain plays over and over-regulators must make high-stakes regulatory choices
that implicate poorly understood risks. Not only are particular regulatory decisions
woven together from strands of uncertainty, but so, too, are the scope and direction
of the regulatory endeavor itself 10
Trustworthy regulators have the potential to enhance society's overall
resilience,l but uncertainty erodes the public's trust and alienates citizens from the
regulatory institutions intended to serve them.' 2 Declining levels of trust in
government institutions both document and reflect this grim reality.13 Loss of trust
undermines regulatory effectiveness and diminishes society's overall capacity to
persevere and even thrive in the face of multiple, unpredictable risks.

8.
The revelations surrounding Vioxx highlight the trust aspects of this
problem. See, e.g., Anahad O'Connor, Vioxx. Celebrex. Now Aleve. What's a Patient to
Think?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at F5 (noting the corrosive effects on trust in the FDA).
9.
Gretchen Morgenstern, Regulators in Need of Rehab, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2008, at BUI ("[T]he leading lights of finance, whether in Washington or on Wall Street,
have completely squandered any trust that taxpayers may have had in them. Earning it back
is going to take time and a commitment to transparency.").
10.
Because such regulatory decisions affect almost every aspect of daily life,
reverberations from these choices about the proper scope of government are widely felt. As
the Supreme Court noted, interactions with some aspect or other of the regulatory state are
the primary ways in which most citizens have contact with their government. Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 276 (1997).
11.
"Resilient social systems have the capacity to anticipate, prepare, and adapt
to change to minimize the effects on social and economic well-being." Heidi Schuttenberg
& Paul Marshall, Managingfor Mass Coral Bleaching: Strategies for Supporting SocioEcological Resilience, in STATUS OF CARIBBEAN CORAL REEFS AFTER BLEACHING AND
HURRICANES IN 2005 115, 116 (Clive Wilkinson & David Souter eds., 2008),
available
at
http://www.icriforum.org/library/Caribbean StatusReport_2005.pdf.
Trustworthy institutions make society more resilient. See id. at 121.
12.

IAN AYRES

& JOHN BRAITHWAITE,

RESPONSIVE REGULATION

19-35 (1992).

13.
For example, the number of individuals expressing the belief that
government is run for the benefit of a few special interests, rather than for the benefit of all,
has increased markedly over the past few decades. AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUDIES, IS THE
GOVERNMENT
RUN
FOR
THE
BENEFIT
OF
ALL:
1964-2004
(2005),
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g5a2_1.htm.
See also Carl Weiser,
Survey: Young People Losing Trust in Government, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-01-16-youngvotersgns x.htm. See generally Robert V. Robinson & Elton F. Jackson, Is Trust in Others
Declining in America? An Age-Period-Cohort Analysi, 30 Soc. ScI. RES. 117 (2001)
(discussing decline in trust of others). This problem is most notable in the context of new
technologies. For example, 95% of respondents in one survey did not trust the government
or industry to manage the risks associated with nanotechnology. JANE MACOUBRIE,
INFORMED PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 5-6
(2005), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/macoubriereport.pdf; see also
Jane Macoubrie, Nanotechnology, Public Concerns, Reasoning and Trust in Government,
15 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 221 (2006). By contrast, the Pew Research Center asserts that
although trust levels declined in the 1990s, they have remained relatively stable over the
past few decades. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND SOCIAL TRUST: WHO, WHERE AND
WHY (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/SocialTrust.pdf.
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Combating uncertainty's corrosive effects on social resilience therefore
demands that we rebuild trust in regulatory systems. But first, we need some
agreement about what we mean by trust. Despite its centrality to regulatory
legitimacy, 14 trust in administrative systems is surprisingly under-theorized.
This Article begins to remedy that situation by constructing a framework
for "regulatory trust"-the unique form of social trust invoked when regulatory
agencies make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. After surfacing and
naming regulatory trust's components, this Article explores the reflexive
relationship between trust and regulatory legitimacy, and grounds that exploration
in emerging scholarly theories of the state and social legitimacy.' 5 Finally, this
Article proposes a new model for regulatory decision-making, one better able to
build, maintain, and restore regulatory trust in the face of uncertainty. In doing so,
this Article argues that regulatory trust can help mediate the inherent tensions
between expertise and uncertainty. By structuring regulatory institutions with an
eye toward facilitating regulatory trust, we can create a more inclusive and
transparent regulatory system. A revitalized, trustworthy regulatory system is, in
turn, the first step toward cultivating the social resilience needed to navigate
modernity's profound uncertainty without dwindling into gloom, chaos, and
defeat.
Part I offers a brief overview of the broader legitimacy crisis as regulatory
systems struggle to cope with uncertainty. Part II explores the relationship among
legitimacy, trust, and expertise. It provides an overview of existing scholarly
treatments of trust-highlighting the commonalities and differences between
various approaches, and disaggregating trust from cooperation. Part III lays out an
analytical framework for understanding regulatory trust as a special form of social
trust. This Section begins by identifying the three core components of regulatory
trust: expertise, stewardship, and transparency. It then shows how these three trust
components underscore the need for a regulatory framework firmly grounded in
the progressive and participatory generation of expert knowledge. To that end, this
Section claims that an inclusive vision of expertise makes regulatory decision14.
See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 106 (1988) (reporting that citizens participating in the legal system
have increased respect for the system); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A
PoliticalPerspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 847, 856-60, 867-70 (1998) (suggesting that trust
in legal institutions determines whether parties perceive the law as legitimate); Mark E.
Warren, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 1-21 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999)
(exploring the complex relationship between trust and democratic processes); see also Lisa

B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56

U. MIAMi L. REv. 873, 907 (2002) (emphasizing the role that stakeholder participation plays
in perceived legitimacy). But see Steven Zeidman, Policingthe Police: The Role of Courts
and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 342 (2005) (emphasizing that not all court
proceedings meet this standard).
15.
Stephen Weatherford crafted a model of legitimacy that dovetails with some
aspects of the regulatory trust model this Article proposes. M. Stephen Weatherford,
MeasuringPoliticalLegitimacy, 86 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 149, 160 (1992). While Weatherford
only explicitly references trust in its interpersonal capacity, his representational procedures
and government performance indicators overlap, sometimes conspicuously, with the
components of regulatory trust.
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making better and is a critical means of generating trust in the midst of
uncertainty. 16 At the same time, this Section emphasizes that encouraging a wide
swath of citizenry to share the burden of governance requires a rethinking of the
processes and perspectives that traditionally surround administrative decisionmaking. Together, these critical changes-re-conceptualizing expertise, expanding
opportunities for participation, and increasing transparency-can provide a crucial
source for regulatory legitimacy in an uncertain world. The Article concludes by
offering some thoughts about how to use this regulatory trust framework to
enhance social resilience.
Organizational studies report that trust is correlated with the ability to
accept unfavorable decisions, particularly those deviating from one's normative
preference. 7 My hope is that understanding the social dynamics that underpin trust
in regulatory institutions will be the first step toward developing a reservoir of
trust sufficient to weather the disagreements that specific regulatory decisions can,
from time to time, generate. If so, public discourse can be shifted away from
personal attacks on those who support or oppose particular regulatory decisions to
focus more on the social variables that continually create and recreate the same
(dis)trust dynamics. 18 This Article begins that process.

16.
See, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 14, at 106 (emphasizing how the
opportunity to participate critically influences perceptions of legitimacy); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY] (arguing
that "an opportunity to take part in the decision-making process" shapes perceptions of
fairness).
17.
See Eric M. Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY AND
TRUST 122 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999); Joel Brockner et al., When Trust Matters: The
ModeratingEffect of Outcome Favorability,42 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 558, 558 (1997).

18.
To be sure, some have posited that distrust can be an organizing principle
that can serve as a rival, or even as a replacement, for trust. BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF TRUST 22-23, 91-94 (1983). See generally VIVIEN HART, DISTRUST AND
DEMOCRACY (1978). Indeed, Luhmann acknowledges that distrust can be the functional
equivalent of trust. NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 71 (1979). Distrust as an
organizing principle attempts to reduce complexity through suspicion, monitoring, and
safeguards. In some ways, feedback loops and mechanisms designed in response to distrust
might be indistinguishable from those that reinforce trust. For example, there is significant
argument as to whether contracts are an emblem of distrust or a vehicle of trust formation.
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1487 (2005) (characterizing
contracts as the antithesis of trust); Ribstein, supra note 3, at 553 (positing that law
undermines trust). But see Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REv.
531, 554 (1995) (describing law and contracts as reinforcing trust and making agreement
possible in situations where it otherwise would not occur).
As Luhmann and Barber suggest, the dynamics of systems built on trust and distrust
are likely to differ significantly. LUHMANN, supra, at 71-72; BARBER, supra, at 20-21. To
my mind, Barber's description of the weaknesses in the argument that society can be
organized around distrust is persuasive-the kind of vigilant and constant monitoring that
distrust requires would be overwhelming. BARBER, supra, at 20-21. Indeed, as Luhmann
points out, strategies of distrust "often absorb the strength of the person who distrusts to an
extent which leaves him little energy to explore and adapt to his environment." LtmMANN,
supra, at 72. I do not, however, discount the importance that healthy skepticism plays in
maintaining trust relationships.
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I. THE PROBLEM: UNCERTAINTY AND REGULATORY
DECISION-MAKING
Conventional wisdom holds that government can promote social trust by
providing fair, impartial, and procedurally sound methods for resolving disputes.
By spreading the mantle of good government over its citizens, and thereby
sheltering them from an otherwise arbitrary and Hobbesian world, the state creates
conditions for social trust. 19 Whatever capacities the state has for action, in turn,
draw upon this trust.
Trust, or its absence, is often invoked to justify government regulatory
action. 20 Headlines bemoaning the fallout from the unfolding financial crisis
highlight regulation's role in restoring broken trust, 2' but also hint at a more
fundamental issue: when government actors 2 2 make official decisions in the face of
uncertainty, what gives legitimacy to those decisions? 23 This question arises more
and more frequently as the "boundary shattering forces"' 24 of globalized markets
and new technologies crash through pre-existing social and political fault lines.
The accelerating tempo of change magnifies uncertainty, in part by disrupting
19.
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 155-57 (1984).
20.
For an expansion on this point, see generally David Kennedy, Challenging
Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 1 (2005).
21.
David Leonhardt, Lesson from a Crisis: When Trust Vanishes, Worry, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at Al; Sarah Knapton, Financial Crisis: Home Safe Sales Soar as
Trust in Banks Collapses, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
personalfinance/savings/3 163 645/Financial-crisis-Home-safe-sales-soar-as-trust-in-bankscollapses.html; Theresa Tedesco, Trust in Short Supply DuringFinancialCrisis, FIN. POST,
Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=798071.
22.
While acknowledging that law does not have a "monopoly . . . across a
whole regulatory 'space,"' and that a multiplicity of possible decisionmakers continually
jockey for influence, this Article intentionally limits its definition of "regulation" while
acknowledging the question raised by global legal pluralism about how to define the term.
Christine Parker, The Pluralizationof Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349, 351
(2008). With the caveat that the resulting definition is incomplete, this project intentionally
limits use of the term "regulation" to the activities of state institutions and state actors
prescribing and proscribing conduct. For an exploration of the expansive views of
regulation posited by legal pluralism, see Julia Black, Decentering Regulation,
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory" World,
54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 134-35 (2001). For a more general exploration of this
point, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007). An
exploration of trust in the context of a more pluralist vision of regulation awaits another
day. Nor does this Article pretend to confront the profound challenge to the very notion of
public law posed by privatization of government functions. For a discussion on this point,
see Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383,
384-86 (2006).
23.
See generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992) (exploring the question of authoritative

decision-making in exhaustive, and sometimes excruciating, detail); see also Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in InternationalLaw: A Process-OrientedApproach
to SustainableDevelopment, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 370-77 (2007).
24.
Ulrich Beck et al., The Theory of Reflexive Modernization, 20 THEORY,
CULTURE & Soc., Apr. 2003, at 1, 2.
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existing social structures. Time-tested evaluative paradigms suddenly seem
inadequate to address society's most pressing concerns.
Modem societies continually wrestle with this conundrum as they
confront the profound indeterminacy of a rapidly changing world. When storied
institutions can collapse overnight, there can be no sense of certainty. We have
seen yesterday's scientific miracles become today's health and environmental
disasters. Disgraced heroes abound, and former truths can suddenly be revealed as
an edifice of lies. "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold .... 25
As parents, uncertainty about whether to trust agency veracity makes us
reluctant to vaccinate our children. As investors, uncertainty about whether to trust
agency competence makes us reluctant to commit our capital. As citizens,
overwhelming uncertainty makes us cynical about the capacity of government to
address our collective problems. The constellation of uncertainties woven into the
26
very fabric of the modem human condition erodes the social capacity for trust.
This situation has produced a "crisis of faith in the grand stories that have justified
our history and legitimized our knowledge. 27
At least in theory, regulation can offer an alternative to the cynicism that
might otherwise result. Credible regulators can provide a durable framework for
social cooperation, one that transcends the particular individuals involved. 28 The
regulatory processes they create may be a tool for managing the otherwise
unfathomable complexity of modern life.2 9 But as the uncertainties compound, can
regulators really play this role?
There is already an uneasy relationship between the definiteness of
regulatory decisions (X facility can emit Y tons of pollutant Z) and the uncertainties
of information and circumstance that shape a regulatory problem (chronic lowlevel exposure to pollutant Z may or may not cause endocrine disruption). 30 Add to
25.
William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1920). Although he was writing
about World War I and its aftermath, these lines give voice to the indeterminacy at the heart
of the modem dilemma.
26.
This ontological uncertainty is in many ways the hallmark of modernity. For
a thought-provoking historical investigation of this issue, see DOROTHY ROSS, MODERNIST
IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1870-1930, 2-25 (1994).
27.
Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnindio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 629 (1990).
28.
Tom Tyler has documented a link between perceptions of legitimacy and
adherence to the law. See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 16, at 170-78 (defining a
link between trust in authorities and institutions and compliance with the law). This
observation has been repeated in experimental studies-trust judgments tend to be more
affected by perceptions of procedural fairness than by distributive justice or outcome
favorability. Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between
Procedural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust 390, 401-03, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom Tyler
eds., 5th ed. 1995).
29.
LUHMANN, supranote 18, at 26 (describing how trust reduces complexity).
30.

ULRICH BECK,

ECOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

89-93 (1995) (using the

question "is formaldehyde poisonous" as a jumping off point for discussing the disconnect
between the experimental method and the risks posed by new technologies).
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that the somewhat murky relationship between expertise and democracy, 31 and the
need for a new perspective on the purposes and goals of regulatory power becomes
clear. The ontological challenge is to replace the quest for certainty with the
acceptance of contingency, while at the same time preserving the ability to make
legitimate administrative decisions.
These nested uncertainties have prompted some post-modem thinkers to
argue that there is no system of social trust at all.32 For these thinkers, any
conversation about social structure or culture misunderstands the fragmented
nature of contemporary society.33 Under this view, ideas of a social order, or of
stability connoted by regulatory institutions, are merely illusions. In a world
without social systems, the idea of regulatory trust must necessarily be an
absurdity. A related attack on the regulatory state comes from instrumental
rationalism. Although motivated by a vastly different theoretical framing,
instrumental rationalism shares post-modemism's profound skepticism about the
existence of a shared normative orientation, and thus similarly discounts a vision
of collective-as opposed to individual-motivations or interests. 34 Despite their
often opposing theoretical visions, the two critiques reach much the same endpoint-denial that legal or social structures can shape, support, or sustain a public
sphere of interest, or.more fundamentally, that a social system can and should be
based on a common vision of the good society.35 In rejecting this conclusion, this
Article instead proposes that social resilience under conditions of uncertainty
hinges on successful development of regulatory trust.
Substantive discussions about choices in the face of uncertainty,
particularly those surrounding choices of whether and how to embrace new
technologies, easily devolve into ad hominem attacks that further strain the social
fabric while adding little to the decisional process. In the debate over the use of
genetically modified food crops, for example, opponents routinely label each other
as "Luddites" or as proponents of "Frankenfoods." 36 The conventional story of
31.

Stephen Turner, What is the Problem with Experts?, 31 SOC.

125-29 (2001); 1 JORGEN

STUD.

SCI. 123,

HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,

at 397

(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1985).
32.

ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE 26

(2002). Bauman refers to this

situation as "liquid ...modernity" and dismisses the possibility of trust in anything other
than the self. Id. at 27. He thus rejects the vision of society as "the 'common property' of its
members which at least in principle can conceivably be tended to, run and managed in
common." Id. at 49.
33.
Id.
34.
For an exploration of this point, see infra Part II.
35.
Habermas describes this common vision as "an intuition about forms of
solidarity that link not only relatives, friends and neighbors within private spheres of life,
but also unite citizens as members of a political community beyond merely legal relations."
JAirgen Habermas, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism,
13 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 2 (2005). Habermas urged against the "colonization" of the lifeworld by
"an unleashed functionalist reasoning" that focuses exclusively on means. HABERMAS, supra
note 31, at 398-99.
36.
Elsewhere, I have described this destructive cycle in the context of
biotechnology. Bratspies, Some Thoughts, supra note 7, at 393-97; Rebecca Bratspies,
Bridging the Genetic Divide: Confidence-Building Measures for Genetically Modified
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such disputes-as rationality pitted against fear and emotion--drastically
oversimplifies, and in the process misrepresents, what is actually at stake. Too
often, regulators and politicians invoke the putative irrationality of their opponents
as a screen to obscure the political choices embedded in regulatory decisions. At
the same time, regulators must responsibly evaluate new technologies and
scientific developments as they unfold. The continuing allegations of political
37
meddling in scientific reporting, particularly around issues of global warming
and abortion,38 underscore the need both to protect and to project scientific
integrity as part of a broader exploration of regulatory legitimacy.39
Crops, 44 JURIMETRICS 62, 65-67 (2003). Beck, Giddens, and Lash describe the
distributional struggle over "bads" that cannot be determined by science, particularly issues
of the standards of responsibility, safety, monitoring, damage limitation, and distribution of
the consequences of damage in an industrial society. BECK ET AL. supra note 5, at 141.
37.
Allegations have swirled for years that political appointees in the Bush
Administration heavily edited scientific testimony and government publications concerning
climate change. In 2007, a House Committee Investigation concluded that the
Administration systematically manipulated climate change science to minimize the dangers
of global warming. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORM, 110TH CONG., POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 16-32
(2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071210101633.pdf Among
the study's conclusions, political appointees edited agency reports "to exaggerate or
emphasize scientific uncertainties or to deemphasize or diminish the importance of the
human role in global warming." Id. at ii.
38.
For example, in July 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services
proposed redefining abortion to include many forms of contraception. The proposed
definition runs counter to how medical science defines pregnancy and abortion as
recognized by the American Medical Association and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. If adopted, the proposal would have enabled health care
providers receiving federal funding to refuse to provide contraception to women requesting
it under a moral conscience theory. See Robert Pear, Abortion ProposalSets Conditions on
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A16. After an enormous public outcry, HHS omitted this
definition. See Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Final Rule: Ensuring That Department of
Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or
Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). Nevertheless, over strenuous objections, the agency included a
definition of "assist in performance" in the final rule ambiguous enough to keep the
question alive. See David G. Savage, 'Conscience' Medical Rule to Take Effect, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2008, at A18 (paraphrasing HHS Secretary Levitt's description that the rule's
scope "includes abortion and other aspects of healthcare where moral concerns could arise.
. such as birth control"). This rule was rushed through the rulemaking process in order to
present the incoming Obama Administration with fait accomplis. In his inaugural address,
President Obama promised to "restore science to its rightful place." President Barack
Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009). Those looking for an in-depth discussion of the
misuses of science in the abortion context might turn to Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial
Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17
J.L. & POL'Y 15 (2008) [hereinafter Borgmann, JudicialEvasion].
39.
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., SCIENCE FOR POLICY PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 11
(Aug. 5 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/12023/features/documents/
2009/08/05/document-.gw_01 .pdf (characterizing the U.S. regulatory system as "plagued by
charges that science is being 'politicized' and that regulation lacks a solid scientific basis").

For a thorough exploration of this problem, see
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TRUST AS AN ANTIDOTE FOR UNCERTAINTY

Contemporary social challenges make issues of trust especially salient. In
the face of ever-increasing rates of change, which many consider to be the
hallmark of modem societies, 40 regulators need new ways to account for
uncertainties and risks. Trust can help. 41 Imperfect information is all that is
available and yet important decisions must still be made in an array of human
situations. A reservoir of social trust helps societies to remain stable even as
administrators make decisions against this overwhelming net of uncertainty.42
At the boundary between confidence and contingency, 43 social trust
becomes a crucial resource for responding to uncertainty, and for enhancing the
legitimacy of decisions made under those conditions. The ideal version of that trust
narrative goes something like this:
I know the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is dedicated to
keeping foods and drugs safe. The FDA has a good track record;
after all, they kept Thalidomide off the market despite European
approval and tremendous pressure. I trust the FDA. Therefore, I
feel confident taking this potentially lifesaving, but also potentially
deadly medicine prescribed by my doctor and produced by a drug
company under the watchful eye of the FDA. 44

61-85 (Wendy Wagner
& Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) (documenting the ways in which interest groups distort the
available science to support political positions); see also CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN
WAR ON SCIENCE 102-20 (2005).
40.
For an explanation of modernity, see generally MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL
THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY (1982); Ross, supra note
26, at 2-14. In using the term "modem" I do not mean to suggest endorsement of a vision of
an evolutionary progress towards an ultimate end that is labeled modernity. I instead use the
term to acknowledge the spread of one specific type of civilization-with its attendant
economic, political, and ideological factors-from its origin in Europe to the rest of the
world. S.N. Eisenstadt, A Reappraisal of Theories of Social Change and Modernization, in
SOCIAL CHANGE AND MODERNITY 412 (Hans Haferkamp & Neil J. Smelser eds., 1992). A
great variety of modem societies developed as this spreading modernity interacted with
various cultures around the world. Although the resulting societies share many common
characteristics that justify the label "modem," they also evince marked differences.
41.
As noted earlier, some argue that distrust can serve a similar simplifying
role. See, e.g., HART, supra note 18, at xii (characterizing distrust as "democratic and
thoughtful, not an anti-democratic outburst of emotion" and as "potentially constructive,
threatening only to vested political interests"). These positions do not necessarily contradict
a trust-based vision of regulation. Social trust in credible regulatory institutions, coupled
with a healthy skepticism of any particular individual, may produce the most reliable,
credible, and trustworthy outcomes.
42.
For an exploration of this point, see Piotr Sztompka, Trust and Emerging
Democracy: Lessons from Poland, I1 INT'L Soc. 37, 39 (1996).
43.
PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST 19-22 (1999).
44.
This is not to suggest a simple story. The recent salmonella in peanut butter
scandal revealed FDA's impotence in maintaining food safety. The Vioxx scandal revealed
FDA's messy conflicts of interest. Trust is easily lost.
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 24-45,
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Trust in the FDA becomes a transitive property. The agency's perceived rigor
creates a mantle of trustworthiness that can vouch for the conduct of third parties,
thereby facilitating desirable social outcomes. Social trust can thus stabilize ambiguous
situations by increasing society's ability to tolerate uncertainty. It does so by
mediating what Adam Seligman eloquently describes as "the interstices of system,
• . . that metaphorical space between roles, that area where roles are open to
negotiation and interpretation. 4 5 Because it enables cooperation in the face of
uncertainty, social trust also offers a path out of the "prisoners' dilemma. ' '4 6 As
social interdependencies and uncertainties span a globally integrated world, both
these roles for social trust become ever more critical.47
There is a problem with the idealized story recounted above. As the reach
of the global market increases, so does uncertainty about the safety of products
exchanged through global trade48 and whether national governments actually
have the capacity to protect their citizens. 49 In a new, more ambiguous global
economic system, a multiplicity of possible decision-makers jockey for
influence-international
organizations
promulgate standards that would
traditionally have been the province of the state, states continue to assert their
authority, and transnational actors, particularly corporations, set up alternative
streams of power and control.
New trade patterns make product safety a moving target. 50 As production
is fragmented across the globe in pursuit of low-cost producers, responsibility
blurs. Too often, this means that oversight falls through the cracks. The sheer
volume of trade stretches regulatory capacity past its breaking point. Regulators

SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 27.
46.
For an explanation of the prisoner's dilemma, see infra Part II.C.
47.
BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES 9 (1996).
48.
Indeed, 2007 was dubbed "the year of the recall" in light of the myriad
products recalled over contamination and other safety concerns. Editorial, Protecting the
Littlest Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A16. See also Kevin Drawbaugh, Toy
Recalls Fuel Momentum Toward U.S. Safety Reforms, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0441473020071004 (quoting CPSC Acting
Chairman Nancy Nord as saying that a "summer of recalls" underlined the need for changes
at the CPSC).
49.
See, e.g., Meglena Kuneva, European Comm'r for Consumer Affairs, Press
Conference Speaking Points at the High Level EU-China-U.S. Trilateral Summit on Product
Safety (Nov. 18, 2008) (noting that the 2007 recalls "showed more clearly than ever that
delivering effective product safety cannot just be a national or even European concern"),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/620&
format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also Peer Zumbansen, Law
After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law,
56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769, 770-74 (2008).
50.
For example, reporting about the tainted cough syrup that killed hundreds in
Panama, The New York Times described "a poison pipeline stretching halfway around the
world." Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 1, at 11 (tracing the diethylene glycol-tainted syrup
from China through Europe to Panama). The article reported that there had been similar
mass poisonings in Haiti, Bangladesh, Argentina, Nigeria, and India, and estimated that the
death toll was in the thousands or tens of thousands.

45.
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simply cannot keep up.5 1 Nor can they credibly claim to be managing the
unforeseen consequences of globalized trade and new technologies. If "[t]rust is
the currency of the global economy,' ' 52 recent history suggests that the foundations
of that trust are increasingly in jeopardy.
Part of the problem has been that governments, pundits, and the public
alike have become confused about what regulatory trust actually is. Thus we see
rhetoric blurring the lines between personal and social trust, or even suggesting
that rationality can supplant the need for trust.53 Separating trust into its various
strands helps surface some of these misconceptions, and therefore facilitates a
more focused discussion about the role that trust plays in the regulatory system.
Surfacing and naming the different roles that trust can play in regulatory systems is
the first step in constructing an analytical framework for regulatory trust. To that
end, what follows is an attempt to sort out and categorize the different kinds of
trust as a necessary precursor to an in-depth exploration of regulatory trust.

A. What Is Trust?
Although trust is often identified as one of the major components of a
society's social capital,54 its role is rarely identified or explored.55 Instead, trust is

51.
For example, while food imports have increased 50% in the past few years,
the number of FDA inspectors has decreased by 20%. See Julie Schmit, U.S. Food Imports
Outrun FDA Resources, USA TODAY, March 18, 2007, at lB. The Consumer Product
Safety Commission reports that product imports into the United States have increased by
more than 100% over the past decade. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N STAFF,
IMPORT

SAFETY

STRATEGY

3

(2008),

available

at

http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/importsafety.pdf. Despite overseeing $2 trillion worth of
products imported by 800,000 importers at 300 ports of entry, id. at 5, the CPSC did not
have a single full-time inspector at any port of entry. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM'N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 21 (2008), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBSREPORTS/2008par.pdf. It was only in March 2008
that the CPSC announced plans to place the first CPSC inspectors at a single port, with the
promise that "additional staff will be assigned to other busy ports as the division is
expanded." Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC to Announce
New
Strategy
at
Ports
(March
5,
2008),
available
at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtm08/08206.html.
Former Health and Human
Services Secretary Mike Leavitt admitted that "[t]he global market has clearly changed the
nature of our challenge in keeping products safe." Margaret Fan, FDA Sending Inspectors to
Foreign Nations, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2008, at A12.
52.
Meglena Kuneva, European Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, Statement at the
2008 Trilateral Summit on Product Safety, (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-china-product-safety-cooperation/article- 177290.
53.
For examples of both phenomena, see infra Parts II.B-C.
54.
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development defines
social capital as "networks together with shared norms, values and understandings which
facilitate
cooperation
within
or
among
groups."
OECD,
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:

GLOSSARY,

2649_37425_1970394_1_1_1

OECD,

http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_

1,00.html#197031 (last visited July 31, 2009). See generally,

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL ISSUES

(2001). For an exploration of social

capital, see generally James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,
94 AM. J. Soc. S95, S95-S 120 (1988).
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an assumed backdrop, an "ever-ready lubricant ' 56 for greasing the wheels of
market exchange and/or democratic governance.57 Annette Baier analogizes trust
to air-something we notice only when it becomes scarce or polluted.58 Because of
this implicit quality, it is difficult to measure trust. Nevertheless, its presence,
absence, or magnitude can be assessed in most circumstances, as recent jeremiads
proclaiming a loss of trust in society demonstrate.5 9 The beginning of the twentyfirst century has already offered many challenges to social trust. When athletes use
performance-enhancing drugs, financiers abscond with billions of dollars, and the
president starts a war based on misinformation and lies, the cumulative60 effect is
widespread loss of trust in social institutions and society more generally.
Sissela Bok argues that social trust is an imperative goal for those who
aspire to an ethically grounded society. 61 Niklas Luhmann asserts that to trust is to
organize one's world.62 Even setting aside that kind of lofty rhetoric, trust is
clearly a basic building block of social interaction.63 Thinkers from many different
55.

There is no unanimity among scholars about whether trust is properly

considered a form of social capital. Francis Fukuyama argues vociferously that trust is a

vital component of social capital. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND
THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 23-41 (1995); see also Eric M. Uslaner, Producing and
Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 589 (2000) ("Trust is a form of social capital, one
of the building blocks of a civil society."). But see Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
495, 521 (2001) ("[T]rust is not a kind of resource and is therefore not a candidate for social
capital.").
56.
Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).

57.

For an exploration of the differing conceptions of trust in psychology,

sociology, political science, economics, and communication, see generally Denise M.
Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 393 (1996).
58.
Annette Baier, Trust andAntitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 234 (1986).
59.
See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 55; ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). Both books,
written at the end of the twentieth century, lamented the falling away from a better, truer
past in which we trusted each other.
For example, in a widely cited 2002 poll, Golin/Harris reported that 70% of
60.
Americans agreed with the statement, "I don't know who to trust." See American Business
Faces a Crisis of Trust (June 28, 2002), http://trustenablement.com/local/GolinHarrisCrisis inAmericanBusiness.pdf. These results seem to be consistent across all the
Western democracies. See Russell J. Dalton, The Social Transformation of Trust in
Government, 15 INT'L REV. SOC. 133, 134-54 (2005) (describing results in various
countries).
61.
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26-27
(1978).
62.
LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 4. Similarly, Russell Hardin calls trust "a way of
dealing with the risks inherent in complexity." Russell Hardin, The Street-Level
Epistemology of Trust, 23 POL. & SoC'Y 505, 516 (1993) [hereinafter Hardin, Street-Level
Epistemology].
Martin Hollis asserts that "[w]e cannot flourish without trust." MARTIN
63.
HOLLIS, TRUST WITHIN REASON 4 (1998). In making this claim, Hollis invokes John Locke,
who described trust as the "bond of society." Id. at I (quoting JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE
LAW OF NATURE 213 (1663)).
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disciplines have explored the central role that trust plays in structuring and
ordering contemporary society. 64 In particular, they posit that when cooperation is
both fragile and essential, trust plays a critical role. 65 These theorists tell us that
without trust the everyday social life we take for granted is simply not possible.66
Moreover, the degree of trust in a society shapes the way individuals perceive and
react to social change.67
Given its ubiquity and centrality, one would expect notions of trust to be
well-established, but Diego Gambetta's musings on the elusive nature of trust still
ring true.6 s In light of the vast number of trees killed to publish psychological,
economic, and sociological studies on the topic, trust's continued elusiveness
seems surprising. Part of the problem may be that the term is used colloquially in
many different contexts, and researchers from many different fields rely on an
intuitive understanding of the term. 69 When researchers do attempt a definition,
controversy soon follows. Indeed there is an ongoing debate within scholarly
circles over the meaning of the term "trust," and there is still no consensus
64.
See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 18, at 20-25; LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 2026. There is a wealth of philosophical writing on this point, but a more general exploration
of this body of work is beyond the scope of this Article.
65.
It is of course possible to overstate the role of trust. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
President Carter's National Security Advisor, reputedly made this point when asked before
the 1985 arms talks in Geneva whether it made sense to trust the Russians. He replied that
the point was "not to trust them" but "to find an agreement that is self-reinforcing."

Geoffrey Hawthorne, Three Ironies in Trust, in TRUST:
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 115 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).

MAKING AND

BREAKING

66.
HOLLIS, supra note 63, at 1-2; LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 4 (describing the
only alternatives to appropriate trust as "chaos and paralyzing fear"); SELIGMAN, supra note
6, at 13; David Good, Individuals, InterpersonalRelations and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS

31-48 (Diego Gambetta, ed. 1988). This use of the

term trust focuses on its social nature rather than viewing trust as wholly the personal
attitude of discrete individuals. Some argue, by contrast, that trust is wholly dependent on
the past experiences of each individual. See Hardin, Street-Level Epistemology, supra note
62, at 506; Baier, supra note 58, at 234 (emphasizing the trusting party's state of mind).
Trust is obviously related to individual disposition, experience, and behavior but is as
obviously related to social networks and institutions.
67.
Caitlin Borgmann describes how trust in judicial fact-finding makes it
possible for witnesses to offer difficult and emotional testimony. Caitlin E. Borgmann,
RethinkingJudicialDeference to Legislative Fact-Finding,84 IND. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2009).

68.

Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust?, in

TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING

(Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
69.
See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic
Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453 (1993) (surveying and disputing many of the different
definitions); see also Lewis & Weigert, supra note 1, at 969 (arguing that because
"individuals ... have no occasion or need to trust apart from social relationships" trust is
primarily a sociological phenomenon). As Barber observes:
We can start by recalling the imprecise and ambiguous use of the term
"trust" in all forms of discourse, from the most ordinary to the most
learned. It is obviously an important social concept, but one that is
confused with many equally important and equally poorly defined
concepts, such as honesty, confidence, and faith.
BARBER, supra note 18, at 164.
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ix,
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definition.7 ° For example, there is disagreement about whether trust is a cause,
effect, or mediator of observable events in the world.7 '
Even without a clear definition, most scholars seem to agree that trust
72
embodies a willingness to accept vulnerability under conditions of uncertainty.
Or, as Gambetta concludes, "For trust to be relevant, there must be the possibility
of exit, betrayal, defection. 73 This Article uses that minimal consensus as a
starting point.
Conceptualizing trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability under
conditions of uncertainty highlights trust's reflexivity. Trust both grows from, and
simultaneously creates, a set of shared expectations that minimizes the risk of
relying on others. 74 Nevertheless, because trust bridges the profound chasm
between autonomous actors, it offers no guarantees. Though trust is a device for
reducing risk, the act of trusting is itself a risk. Existential uncertainty-the never
wholly dismissible possibility that trust may be misplaced-bubbles up time and
again.

70.
Rousseau et al., supra note 57, at 394 ("To date, we have had no universally
accepted scholarly definition of trust."). Luhmann suggested limiting trust to interpersonal
interactions and reserving the term "confidence" for "trust" in the ability of social
institutions to function as expected. Niklas Luhmann, Familarity, Confidence and Trust:
Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94105 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). Others have proposed other parsing schemes where
confidence stems from ability and trust stems from disposition or motivation, see Dasgupta,
supra note 56, at 52 n.3, or trustworthiness as an aspect of disposition and trust as
contingent on circumstance, id. at 54. See also Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS
26, 28-29 (1996). I am not persuaded of the utility of these distinctions. They give the
illusion of precision and specificity in a context fraught with ambiguity and interrelation.
Quibbling with the distinctions between these various subcategories too often turns into an
intellectually satisfying means to avoid focusing on the question of social trust itself.
For a discussion of this point, see Rousseau et al., supra note 57, at 396-97
71.
(providing a brief literature review on this point). See also Toko Kiyonari et al., Does Trust
Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A
Research Note, 69 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 270 (2006) (trying to sort out the relationship between
trust and trustworthiness).
72.
MISZTAL, supra note 47, at 21 ("Central to the concept of trust, seen as
embodied in structures of social relations, is uncertainty about other people's
motivations."); Baier, supra note 58, at 235 (describing trust as "accepted vulnerability to
another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one"); Luhmann,
supra note 70, at 97 ("Trust ...presupposes a situation of risk."); Roger C. et al., An
Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 709, 712 (1995)
(defining trust as a willingness to be vulnerable); Rousseau et al., supra note 57, at 395
(same); Ribstein, supra note 3, at 565. The best description of this relationship between
vulnerability and trust comes from Guido Mollering, who characterized trust as "both highly
uncomfortable and highly positive" because it reminds actors of the harm others might
cause them while at the same time implying that this vulnerability might not be problematic
in practice. GUIDO MOLLERING, TRUST: REASON, ROUTINE, REFLEXIVITY 6 (2006).
Gambetta, supra note 68, at 218-19.
73.
74.
Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure 1890-1920, 8 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 53, 54 (1986).

590

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:575

Were the world filled with perfectly rational actors, each of whom has equal
bargaining power and perfect information, trust would be a far less interesting
phenomenon. Under these (unrealistic) circumstances, trusting would not create much
vulnerability, because with almost total predictability to individual and group
interactions, trust would hardly be necessary. 75 By contrast, it is when things are not
certain, when possibilities are contingent, and decisions turn on a host of unknown or
unknowable factors, that trust is most important, and most difficult.
This exploration of regulatory trust builds on a well-established insight
about the relationship between trust and legitimacy in the judicial context.76 Law
school professors love to regale their classes with the value of "having one's day in
court." 7 The message is clear: while parties may prefer to win their cases, having
access to the courts, being heard, and having claims seriously considered creates
trust in the judicial system as a whole. This trust gives a society the resilience
necessary to avoid the destabilization that adverse outcomes might otherwise
generate. Sociological evidence bears this out. 78 Win or lose, there is a social value
in having access to the courts. One may not always agree with the result, but if
there is a sense that the process has been legitimate and the tribunal unbiased,79
one is more willing to accept results that run counter to one's normative
75.
The Cold War creed "You Can Trust the Communists (to be Communists)"
is an example. FREDERICK C. SCHWARZ, You CAN TRUST THE COMMUNISTS (1961).
Originally published by The Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the essay is available at
http://www.schwarzreport.org/ycttable.htm. When there is no uncertainty as to how
information will be processed and acted upon, trust is either inherent to interactions, or,
depending on how one frames the question, irrelevant.
76.
See Borgmann, JudicialEvasion, supra note 38. Any direct analogy between
judicial process and administrative process is fraught with difficulty because administrative
agencies act in both a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative capacity. While fully cognizant
of those difficulties, the point I am trying to make is a different one. I am not trying to
compare processes, or to create a yardstick for legitimacy, but to use the judicial system as
an example of a successful interaction between trust, process, and legitimacy.
77.
Scholars routinely identify this notion of "having one's day in court" as a
central principle, or at least a central myth, of our legal system. Indeed, the idea is so central
that it appears in hundreds of law reviews, without citation-the importance of "having
one's day in court" is apparently self-evident enough to escape law review editors'
continual demands for authority. The judiciary has also been known to wax eloquent about
the importance of "having one's day in court." See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762
(1989) (referring to "[o]ur deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own
day in court"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (characterizing this principle as "[r]epresenting a profound
attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and
government").
78.
For a survey of research documenting this point, see Brockner & Siegel,
supra note 28, at 390-410. See generally DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER
15-36 (1991) (noting the relationship between legitimacy and shared beliefs); Tom R.
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
375 (2006); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 7-18 (2002) (advocating a "process-based
model of regulation that encourages voluntary deference" to authorities based on fairness in
exercise of authority).
79.
These are, of course, big "ifs."
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preferences. The concept of regulatory trust developed in this Article tries to
identify the conditions under which the same might be said of regulatory decisionmaking.
Before focusing on regulatory trust, it is worth walking through the
alternative conceptions of trust most often offered as a substitute for the kind of
social trust implicated in the regulatory context. The two most significant
alternatives are personal relationships and rational calculation. The rest of this
Section explores these alternatives and explains why neither suffices as the basis
for a credible regulatory system. This Section ends with a description of social
trust which forms the basis for the regulatory trust paradigm developed in the rest
of the Article.
B. Thick Trust Between Individuals
Some argue that the only way to produce trust is to rely on interpersonal
relationships. Under this model, sometimes called "thick" 80 or "strong ' 81 trust,
cooperative interactions occur wholly between persons of known disposition and
82
character. Many traditional societies function based on this kind of "thick trust.,
A precondition of a society based on thick trust seems to be a small,
tightly knit, and homogenous society. When every individual's identity is bound
up with group membership, thick trust within the group can be a powerful force for
organizing and maintaining society. 83 This does not mean that thick-trust
relationships are not betrayed in such societies, or that such betrayal does not
resound to the society's detriment. Instead, the point is merely that intimate
relationships make it possible to rely on thick trust as an ordering principle.
Structural changes flowing from the Industrial Revolution of the
nineteenth century transformed Western societies in ways that made relying on
thick trust far more problematic.84 Urbanization and industrialization meant that
individuals and local communities developed an ever-widening circle of
interaction. 85 With formerly insulated groups interacting while also remaining
80.

ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 9 (2002); Bernard

Williams, Formal Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 12 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988);. PUTNAM, supra note 59, at
136-37.
81.
Ribstein, supra note 3, at 558-68.
82.
The Chinese concept of guanxi has obvious parallels here, and this principle
forms one of the bases of the Kairetsu structure for business. Although these systems
certainly have many strengths, they also have weaknesses. The downsides of such a
structure are hinted at by the unflattering label "crony capitalism."
83.
For a description of the complex web of trust relationships in a traditional
society, see PARKER MACDONALD

84.

SHIPTON,

THE NATURE OF ENTRUSTMENT 99-119 (2007).

For an evocative description of this chaotic period in American history, see

generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967). The technological

revolution of the twentieth century seems to be producing changes on a comparable scale. If
so, we will once again need to rethink social trust in light of new realities.
85.
As Alan Wolfe puts it: "[t]o be modem is to face the consequences of
decisions made by complete strangers while making decisions that will affect the lives of
people one will never know."

ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL
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distanced, social relations became more contingent. Cohesive group identification
lessened as a result, with a concomitant weakening in the shared bonds necessary
to establish thick trust.
The neoconservative take on this phenomenon has been one of
lamentation-mourning the perceived erosion of trust and trustworthiness in
modem society. 86 Empirical evidence provides some support for this concern;
indeed, numerous surveys show that public trust in government has been on the
decline since the 1960s.87 Critics, however, rightly point out that it is important to
avoid valorizing thick trust based on exclusion of "the other." 88 Modem societies
are not homogeneous, and thus social trust must necessarily rest on inclusion
rather than exclusion.
As societies grow in size and complexity, the disadvantages of relying on
thick trust multiply. There are simply too many interactions among too many
parties at too great a distance. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage is that at the
beginning of every interaction with a new individual or entity, trust must be
painstakingly constructed from zero. As societies become more complex, with
sharp divisions of labor and increased interactions with strangers, it becomes
impracticable to continually construct thick trust every time individuals interact. 89
Moreover, invocations of thick trust can seem out of place as a means to
address political uncertainty of the modem state. For example, former President
George W. Bush's announcement that he had looked Vladamir Putin "in the eye
[and]

. .

. found him to be very trustworthy" was an invocation of thick trust as the

basis for United States-Russian relations.9" Because such an expression of thick

OBLIGATION 3 (1989).
86.
FUKUYAMA, supra note 55, at 23-41; PUTNAM, supra note 59, at 287-91;
Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler, Whither Trust?, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 3
(Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 5th ed. 1995). This vision of trust places the
entire burden for making society work onto traditional voluntary associations and the
traditional family unit. Warren, supra note 14, at 14.
87.
See generally Am. Nat'l. Election Studies, The ANES Guide to Public
Opinion and Electoral Behavior: Trust in the Federal Government 1958-2004,
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a-l.htm; see also A.H. Miller,
PoliticalIssues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 951, 951-53
(1974).
88.
For an exploration of this point, see Orlando Patterson, Liberty Against the
Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary Sources of American Distrust, in
DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 199-204 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999).
89.
For example, we are all wholly dependent on the skill and care employed
(we hope) by the anonymous engineers of the subways we ride, the manufacturers of the
medicine we take, and the workers who assemble our child-safety seats, refrigerators, and

automobiles. We have little chance of meeting these individuals, and thus cannot interact on
the basis of thick trust. See Hardin, Street-Level Epistemology, supra note 62, at 510-11

(remarking that trust can be based on many sources other than thick relationships).
90.
President Bush not only announced that he had looked Russian Federation

President Vladimir Putin "in the eye ... [and] found him to be very straightforward and

trustworthy" but continued by adding that "I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man

deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country .... I wouldn't have
invited him to my ranch if I didn't trust him." President George Bush & Russian Federation

20091

REGULATORY TRUST

593

trust seemed bizarre in the context of state-to-state diplomatic interactions, Bush's
statement was greeted with disbelief and derision.
One recent attempt to base administrative decision-making on thick trust
reveals the shortcomings of such an approach. The Quincy Library Group, 9'
(QLG) a California-based grassroots project, sought to make management
decisions for portions of the Lassen, Plumas, and Tahoe national forests through a
selected local stakeholder cooperation.92 Conflicting aspirations for these forests,
particularly with regard to old-growth trees that provided habitat to the endangered
spotted owl, had devolved into a "timber war" between the timber industry and
environmentalists. The QLG set out to find common ground in order to end the
timber war. The QLG specifically excluded government officials and
representatives of national conservation groups from its "consensus-building"
decisional process on the theory that they would "aggravate frustrations. 93 After
dozens of meetings, the QLG, which began as a collection of "uncomfortable
individuals and contentious factions," had become a "very easy-going and
cohesive group. 94 With thick trust established, the QLG developed an alternative
forest management plan for nearby national forests, one that allowed significantly
more logging than did the Forest Service's forest management plan. For this
reason, the Forest Service initially rejected QLG's forest management plan as
inconsistent with its obligations under National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the Forest Management Act and the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, the
plan proposed by the QLG was less protective of endangered species and oldgrowth forests than was the Forest Service Plan. Nevertheless, after significant
lobbying, the QLG's plan was enacted into law by the Herger-Feinstein Quincy
President Vladimir Putin, Press Conference (June 16, 2001), available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/06/16/0000-type82914type82915-142990.shtml.
91.
The Quincy Library Group (QLG )maintains a website. See The Quincy
Library Group Home Page, http://www.qlg.org/.
92.
QLG formed as a local response to the never-ending "timber wars" over
timber management in a 2.3 million acre area in the Lassen, Plumas, and Sierra counties of
California. These "wars" included court battles, alleged sabotage, and even death threats
between environmentalists and loggers. William Varettoni, Success Overdue at the Quincy
Library: Pitfalls in Public Participation, PROP. & ENVTL. RES. CENTER (June 2005),
available at http://www.perc.org/articles/article549.php. The QLG discussions began in
1992 between a Sierra Pacific Industries district manager, a Plumas county supervisor, and a
local environmental attorney.
93.
Bill Coates, Finding Common Ground: Restoring a Small Town Economy
and National Forests to Health, QUINCY LIBR. GROUP, http://www.qlg.org/pub/

miscdoc/coates.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); A Clear View, QUINCY LInR. GROUP, (Nov.
20, 1997) http://www.qlg.org/pub/Perspectives/clearviewl12097.htm. The QLG's exclusion
of national conservation groups is well-known. See Letter from the Wilderness Society,
Sierra Club, & Natural Resources Defense Council to William Jefferson Clinton, President
(May
18
1994),
available
at
http://www.qlg.org/pub/archive/archive94/
twsnrdcsc051894.htm; National Audobon Society, Audobon Official Position on Quincy
Library Group Bill (Sept. 20, 1997), available at http://www.qlg.org/pub/Perspectives/

audubonposition.htm.
94.
Pat Terhune & George Terhune, Engaging, Empowering, and Negotiating
Community: Strategiesfor Conservation and Development, QUINCY LIBR. GROUP (Oct. 8,
1998), http://www.qlg.org/pub/miscdoc/casestudy.htm.
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Library Group Forest Recovery Act. 95 As a means of restoring a sense of
community in Quincy, the project may have been a success, but it amounted to
fewer protections for treasured national resources in the name of local
compromise. Thick trust within the QLG came at the expense of stewardship, with
inappropriate compromises on wider issues like ecosystem management,
endangered species habitat, and forest-wide planning. For this reason, few
informed commentators would hold the project up as a model for cooperative
regulation. The Quincy experience instead underscores the inadequacy of thicktrust relationships for solving multi-scalar problems.
There is scarcely any form of activity in modem society that does not
require the social collaboration of human beings not personally known to one
another. For these kinds of interactions, trust arises from the context in which the
action occurs rather than from the attributes of any specific trusted individual. This
kind of trust is social rather than personal-it resides in processes and systems
rather than individuals. What it shares with thick trust is the ability to simplify
complexity-and it does not have to be constructed anew for each new interaction.
The unfolding Madoff saga shows how badly things can go awry when
thick trust gets confused with social trust in a complex, modem society. Bernard
Madoff was a professional money manager with a stellar reputation. He delivered
consistent returns to his investors year after year-regardless of what the market
did as a whole.96 His investors included the rich and famous, other sophisticated
investors, and numerous charities, as well as countless ordinary folks.97 Many of
his investors had long personal relationships with him, and they all described him
as trustworthy.9 8 On December 12, 2008, Madoff was arrested for investment
fraud, accused of running a giant Ponzi scheme. 99 His investors lost at least $50
billion.100

95.
The Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. IV, § 401, 112 Stat. 2681-305 to 2681-310 (1998) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 2104 (2006)). For a description of the Quincy Library Group saga, see RONALD D.
BRUNNER ET AL., FINDING COMMON GROUND: GOVERNANCE AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 159-200 (2002); ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: EXPLORATIONS IN
COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND THE AMERICAN WEST

(Philip Brick et al. eds., 2001).

At the time, supporters hailed the group as a new model for cooperative regulation, while
opponents objected to privileging local relationships and interests over national priorities.
These alternative viewpoints capture some of the ambivalence about the place thick trust
might hold in modern administrative decision-making. The extensive literature on agency
capture also speaks to this question.
96.

Ponzi

Squared,

ECONOMIST,

Dec.

15,

2008,

http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?storyid
(describing Madoff's "unnaturally consistent" results).

=

available

at

12795543

97.
See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Crossing
Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A20 (detailing the network of personal relations
between Madoff and his investors); Alan Feuer, StandingAccused: A Pillarof Financeand
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at B1.

98.

See Henriques, supra note 97; Feuer, supra note 97.

99.
Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, Prominent Trader Accused of
DefraudingClients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at Al.
100.

Id.
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Colleagues report that Madoff was "very involved" with regulators, often
acting as a consultant or sounding board. 0'l This relationship had clear strategic
advantages. As one anonymous colleague commented: "If you're very close with
regulators, they're not going to be looking over your shoulders that much. Very
smart." 10 2 And, in fact, regulators ignored tips about Madoff's activities. 0 3 It
seems clear that a sense of personal relationship blinded otherwise sophisticated
investors, and even government regulators, to the warning signs that Madoff's
operations needed more scrutiny. It is worth remembering that the "con" in
"conman" stands for "confidence." Scammers prey on society by using personal
relationships to create a cocoon of trustworthiness, and that cocoon often deflects
even the kind of credible tips of wrongdoing that the SEC received about
Madoff.10 4 In short, investors and regulators alike confused thick trust based on
personal relations with the trust that grows from effective regulatory oversight.' 05
Indeed, the common reaction to the scandal was reportedly universal disbelief, not
that such a fraud occurred, but that it was perpetuated by "one of the good
guys.' 0 6
The Madoff situation involved breaches of both thick personal trust and
social trust. The former, no doubt, profoundly affected the individuals involved.
But what might have been limited to a personal tragedy instead became a public
crisis because regulators inappropriately relied on thick trust instead of fulfilling
their end of the social trust bargain (performing competent regulatory oversight).' 0 '
In doing so, the regulators breached their duties to the public. The ramifications of
this mistake are shaking the financial foundations of our society.
While thick trust certainly forms the basis for many of our daily
interactions with family, colleagues, and friends, these examples clearly
demonstrate that modem societies also require a ground for trust not based on
101.
Julie Creswell & Landon Thomas, Jr., The Talented Mr. Madoff N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2009, at B 1.
102.
Id. (quoting an anonymous source).
103.
Binyamin Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Didn't Act on Madoff
Tips, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at D1; Binyamin Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC
Ignored Credible Madoff Tips, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at D1.
104.
The
Bernard Madoff Case:
Trust
Takes Another
Blow,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Jan. 7, 2009, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=2131 (describing how regulators improperly relied on Madoff's status
as "one of them"); Alex Berenson, '92 Ponzi Case Missed Signals about Madoff, N.Y.

Jan. 16, 2009, at Al.
105.
This is not to discount the role that the Bush Administration's profound
ideology of deregulation had in shaping the Madoff affair. There were many contributing
factors.
TIMES,

106.

Eric J. Weiner, Betrayal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A31.

107.

The Nation described the fallout thusly: "Madoff has sown the seeds of

suspicion everywhere. He has caused us to doubt men and women with whom we have done
business with for years. There is no way of knowing if someone is a con artist. The
presumption of trust is gone." Nicholas von Hoffnan, BernardMadoff, Trust-Buster, THE
NATION,
Dec. 17, 2008, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081229/
howl3?rel=hpcurrently. Or, as Russell Hardin comments "[t]rust can finally be stupid and
even culpable." Hardin, Street-Level Epistemology, supra note 62, at 513.
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thick social relationships. 08 Confusion on this point leads to social disaster. Once
we acknowledge this, a new way to lubricate the wheels of social interaction
becomes necessary.
There are two basic responses to this problem: rejection of the need for
trust in favor of calculative self-interest, or, in the alternative, the invocation of
social rather than interpersonal trust. The former is based on the premise that only
interactions grounded in thick trust should properly be termed trust
relationships, 10 9 and that all other interactions should be considered "calculative"
rather than trust-based. The latter possibility looks instead to the bridging role that
institutions play in spanning the gap between thick trust and modem society. As
discussed in the next Section, the extremely narrow vision of trust represented by
calculative rationality has obtained currency in law and economics circles.
Unfortunately, this approach to trust offers little prospect for enhancing overall
social resilience. Social trust, by contrast, can readily become a building block for
a more resilient society. While social trust certainly has a personal component, it
rests on more than the private virtues of individuals and the relationships between
them. Instead, social trust looks to institutional procedures, priorities, and
outcomes for its justification and support. The Sections that follow discuss both of
these options in some detail.
C. Trust as RationalCalculation
Starting from the premise that individuals are motivated to maximize their
personal gains and minimize their personal losses' ' 0 in social interactions, rationalchoice theorists posit that most social interactions can be explained through a selfinterested, instrumental lens.ilI Prisoner's dilemma games," 2 which tease out these

108.
For Francis Fukuyama, social trust stems from thick trust within "preexisting communities of shared moral norms and values." FUKUYAMA, supra note 55, at
336. Fukuyama's work has been roundly criticized for rejecting modernity and
romanticizing pre modem virtue. HOLLIS, supra note 63, at 3; Barbara A. Misztal, Trust and
Cooperation: The Democratic Public Sphere, 37 J. Soc. 371, 373 (2001). Pamela Paxton
turns this equation of "thick personal trust produces social trust" on its head. Pointing out
that trust in institutions seems more resilient than individual trust, she argues that the
"relatively ... steady trust in institutions ... [may be] our best hope of restoring trust in
individuals." Pamela Paxton, Trust in Decline?, 4 CONTEXTS 40, 45 (2005).

109.

Williamson, supra note 69, at 479-84. He describes bounded rationality and

opportunism as the conditions that govern not only contractual relations but also "the
systems context in which contracts are embedded." Id. at 485. This line of thinking has a
proud heritage stretching all the way back to T6nnies' assertion that trust relationships can
only exist in Gemeinschaft. FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 252 (Jose
Harris ed., 2001). As a middle ground, Carol Rose proposes "semi-rational trust." Rose,
supra note 18, at 535-38.

110.
Such an approach presumes, of course, that individuals have fixed
preferences and can assess whether any particular outcome will result in a gain or a loss.
111.

There is a vast literature on rational-choice theory. Readers looking for an

introduction might consider:

JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990);

supra note 19; and Hardin, Street-Level Epistemology, supra note 62.
112.
Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher first posited the Prisoner's Dilemma in
1950. Their work was formalized and popularized by Albert Tucker, who gave it the name

AXELROD,
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instrumental motivations, have shaped this rationalist analysis of trust. 113 Because
this theory served as the intellectual justification for the deregulation movement in
the United States, it is worth discussing in some detail." 4 This Section highlights
115
the ways that discounting the social framework within which interactions occur
produces an incomplete picture of trust."16 My intent is not only to focus attention
on the theoretical flaws in rational-choice reasoning but also to highlight how an
alternative set of assumptions leads to a very different vision of regulatory
decision-making and its role in the construction of social trust.
To the extent that rational-choice theorists invoke trust as a means of
facilitating cooperation, that trust grows from rational and instrumental18
considerations. 17 For these thinkers, we live in a society of individuals."
Accordingly, value-maximizing, calculating individuals make choices that create
society and achieve the social good, without the need for regulatory interventions.
This is rational choice.

"Prisoner's Dilemma." A.W. Tucker, The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler, 14 TwoYEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 228, 228 (1983). For a brief historical overview of the evolution
of game theory, see Phillip D. Straffin, Jr., Changing the Way We Think About the Social
World, 14 TWO-YEAR C. MATHEMATICS J. 229, 229-30 (1983). For an in-depth description
of game theory's birth, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).

113.
Game theory explores conflict situations in which players must make a
choice and where the ultimate outcome of the conflict is determined in some prescribed way
by the cumulative choices made by all the players. POUNDSTONE, supra note 112, at 6.
114.

In his first inaugural address, President Reagan captured this point of view

when he famously declared, "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our
problem; government is the problem." President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, 1
PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981). In light of the role that deregulation played in the recent
financial collapse, this view has less resonance than it once did.
115.
This point is elucidated in JOHN M. GILLROY ET AL., A PRIMER FOR LAW &
POLICY DESIGN 1-13 (2008).
116.
Criticism of rational-choice theory is voluminous. A reader might consider
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988); TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 16.
117.
COLEMAN, supra note I 1l, at 99 (claiming that trust "is nothing more or less
than the considerations a rational actor applies in deciding to place a bet"). Indeed, some
game theorists openly dispute that trust plays a role in these interactions at all. Axelrod, for
example, noted that "Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long
run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation
with each other." ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 184 (1984).
Williamson entirely rejects the notion of trust, asserting that if behavior could be explained
in calculative terms, then it ought not be characterized as trust. Williamson, Organization,
supra note 69, at 469-75. Indeed, Williamson's schema takes this point so far that he
scarcely allows for thick trust. Id. at 484 ("[T]rust, if it obtains at all, is reserved for very
special relations between family, friends, and lovers.").
118.
Critics of this position bemoan that "the very idea of society today is haunted
by a kind of individualism out of which no society can be conceived, as it obfuscates its
political dimension." Antoon Braeckman, The Closing of the Civic Mind, Marcel Gauchet
on the 'Society of Individuals,' 94 THESIS ELEVEN 29, 30 (2008) (describing Marcel
Gauchet's theory of a society of individuals).
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This story begins with invocation of the prisoner's dilemma. The classic
iteration involves two prisoners arrested for an unspecified crime. Not having
enough evidence for a conviction, the police speak with the prisoners separately,
offering each a Faustian bargain. If one prisoner agrees to testify against the other,
who remains silent, the defector goes free and the silent accomplice receives a tenyear sentence. If both remain silent, both face six months in jail for a minor charge.
If both defect by agreeing to testify, thereby betraying each other, both will receive
a five-year sentence. 1 9
For each prisoner, the game presumes that the best individual result is
always obtained by confessing-either by betraying an accomplice who remains
silent, or by betraying an accomplice who is also striking a deal with the
prosecution-thus creating an incentive to confess. The best overall result is
obtained if both remain silent. If both confess, each faces an outcome that is worse
than had both remained silent. There is, thus, an incentive not to confess. But, a
prisoner who remains silent and whose accomplice defects is the game's
sucker-the worst position possible. Although the ultimate outcome depends on
the collective choices made by the accomplices, each prisoner
must choose without
20
knowing what the other has chosen. This is the dilemma.
The question then becomes: what is the "rational" choice in a prisoner's
dilemma game? 12 It depends. A focus on individuals suggests that the rational
choice is to confess even though each player's individual reward would be greater
had they both remained silent. A focus on the overall welfare of the group suggests
that remaining silent is the rational strategy. Prisoners who can trust their
accomplices not to confess are better off as a class than are prisoners who cannot
trust their accomplices. This is true even though individual prisoners who betray
their accomplices might be better or worse off than individual prisoners who do
not. Trust or its absence shapes which choices are "rational." It makes no sense to
remain silent unless the players trust each other, because it is a choice that risks
making that player the game's sucker but also has the potential for maximizing
joint welfare.122

119.
See Tucker, supra note 112.
120.
For a discussion of how prisoner's dilemma games are used and misused in
legal theory, see Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009) (pointing out that although prisoner's
dilemma games are only a small subset of game theory, these games loom unduly large in

the legal literature).
121.
A principal heuristic of rational-choice theory is that a potential trustee's
trustworthiness, as perceived by a potential trustor, can be expressed in terms of a

probability, and that rational actors will only place trust if the net expected value of trust
(the potential loss or gain multiplied by the corresponding likelihood of occurrence) is

positive. See COLEMAN, supra note Ill, at 99. However, actors faced with questions of
whether to trust lack access to this information pretty much by definition. Thus, as
M61lering points out, rational-choice thinking about trust rests on a paradox. MOLLERING,
supra note 72, at 17. Moreover, experimental evidence does not bear out this hypothesized

connection between trust and trustworthiness. See Kiyonari et al., supra note 71, at 280.
122.
Some assert that trust is a precondition for cooperation. Others characterize
trust as a result of, rather than as a precondition for, cooperation. For a discussion, see
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According to rational-choice theory, the rational result is to defect, and in
the game, many players do select that option. The same is not necessarily true in
the world. The disconnect between results in the game and results in the world
stems, at least in part, from artificialities inherent in the game-the players are not
subject to enduring consequences for their choices, have no ties of loyalty, fear,23or
love to anyone else in the game, and participate for only a short period of time.1
By contrast, interactions in the real world are rarely limited to purely
dyadic relationships between atomistic and ahistorical actors. 124 Trust decisions are
instead embedded in particular contexts, made in light of particular histories, and
motivated by the confluence of multiple, sometimes conflicting, values. 25 These
decisions often involve actors besides those bestowing and receiving trust. 2 6 And,
of course, in the world it is not always obvious whether someone has acted
cooperatively or defected, nor do the "games" that people play outside the
laboratory have any clear boundaries. As a result, any generalizing from prisoner's
dilemma games
to actual social, political, or economic activities must be carefully
27
qualified. 1
More realistic games cure some, but not all of these problems. The
iterated prisoner's dilemma has players engaging in repeat interactions rather than
making a single isolated decision. This version of the game therefore includes faint
echoes of those conditions that give rise to thick trust.128 Perhaps not surprisingly,
129
cooperative behaviors (which prisoner's dilemma games conflate with trust)
increase in the iterated version. When the players expect multiple interactions
during the course of the game, their behavior changes. 130 Even within a single
Gambetta, supra note 68, at 235.
123.
And of course there is the problem of false confessions, a variable that the
game does not consider, but one that must be of significant concern to a system focused on
justice.
124.
For an elaboration on this point, see Good, supra note 66, at 33.
125.
Jon Elster offers a rousing exploration of the contradictory impulses at the
heart of many human choices. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 157-79 (rev. ed. 1984).
126.
Zucker describes reputation as "a symbolic representation of past exchange
history" and notes that brand names serve as a proxy for reputation. Zucker, supra note 74,
at 62.
127.
For a critique of this relentlessly individual approach to trust, see Frankel,
supra note 4, at 462.
128.
Douglass North points out that "the essence of impersonal exchange is the
antithesis of the condition for game theoretic cooperation. But the modem Western world
does in fact exist."

DOUGLASS

C.

NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12 (1990).

129.
Because trust and cooperation are conflated, these studies are both overinclusive and under-inclusive. The analytical model has no way of distinguishing
cooperation that occurs despite lack of trust from trust-based cooperation, nor can it
distinguish a decision not to cooperate despite trusting with a refusal to cooperate based on
lack of trust. These problems are inherent to an experimental model that treats trust and
cooperation as interchangeable. For an exploration of these points, see Toshio Yamagishi et
al., Separating Trustfrom Cooperation:Prisoner'sDilemma with Variable Dependence, 17
RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 275, 276 (2005).
130.
POUNDSTONE, supra note 112, at 101-16.
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round of the game, or in related one-off trust games, 31 researchers report that
subjects display far more trusting behavior than the theory suggests.' 32 In
interpreting games, it is important to remember this initial simplification of trust
and to assess any results not only within the experimental design but also against a
133
richer and more complex conception of trust. The notion that reputation matters,
and that trusting behavior occurs, even in the context of a prisoner's dilemma,
highlights trust's reflexivity 134 and suggests limits for extrapolating from the game
to more complex real-world situations.
Nor is trust the same thing as cooperation. 135 For one thing, cooperation
can be induced by fear as well as by trust. 136 It is nearly impossible for game
theory to distinguish cooperation based on trust from cooperation rooted in an
exercise of power.' 37 While that difference may be of little import within
131.
For a detailed description of trust games, see Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 4971; see also MOLLERING, supra note 72, at 33-37.
132.
Luca Crudeli et al., Social Capital or Economic Rents? An Experimental
Study, 20 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 311, 321-30 (2008); Nahoko Hayashi et al., Reciprocity,
Trust, and the Sense of Control, 11 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 27, 35-40 (1999); Harvey S.
James, Jr., The Trust Paradox:A Survey of Economic Inquiries into the Nature of Trust and
Trustworthiness, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 291, 305-07 (2002) (pointing out that trust
can exist even despite a lack of rational incentives); Kiyonari et al., Social Exchange and
Reciprocity: Confusion or a Heuristic?21 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 421-27 (2000);
see generally, Dean G. Pruitt & Melvin J. Kimmel, Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming:
Critique, Synthesis, and Suggestionsfor the Future, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 363, 376-84
(1977).
133.
Dasgupta, supra note 56, at 59. There is also a significant body of work
showing that game players are willing to incur a loss in order to punish what they believe to
be inappropriate behavior. For a survey of this work, see Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdichter,
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL

ECONOMICS 510-18 (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004);
see also Werner Gith, et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,3 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 371-75 (1982); Daniel J. Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and
ErraticAwards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 5872 (1998); Daniel J. Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 728-29 (1986).
134.
Giddens calls this self-reinforcing and self-transforming aspect of trust
"active trust." Anthony Giddens, Risk, Trust, Reflexivity, in BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE
MODERNIZATION, supra note 5, at 184-97.

135.
For a more general critique of behavior economics along this line, see
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundationsof Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 320-26 (1977) (questioning the use of observed choices to
identify and define preferences); see also Yamagishi et al., supra note 129, at 278
(convincingly demonstrating that trust and cooperation must be considered separate
phenomena).
136.
Coercion can temporarily substitute for trust but does not provide a basis for
maintaining a social order over time. SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 13.
137.
See Cynthia Hardy et al., Distinguishing Trust and Power in
Interorganizational Relations: Forms and Fagades of Trust, in TRUST WITHIN AND
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS 64-86 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998)
(criticizing theories of trust that cannot distinguish cooperation based on trust from
cooperation rooted in explicit or implicit power relations).
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laboratory games, it is a vital distinction in the real world. Even taking the "trust
equals cooperation" equation at face value, rational choice runs into a fundamental
paradox. The relentless logic of backwards induction suggests that cooperation is
rarely possible between actors with different preferences. 38 The world is,
nevertheless, replete with examples of such cooperation. 39 Resort solely to
instrumental values cannot adequately account for cooperation, let alone trust. 40
Moreover, where rational-choice theory posits rational actors coolly
weighing indicia of trustworthiness to calculate trust decisions, 14 1 uncertainty is a
hallmark of situations requiring trust. There is a stark contrast between the precise
and simple world of game theory and the messy imprecision of human
interactions. Would-be trustors must often make the choice to trust against a
backdrop of unreliable, inconclusive, or even no evidence. They have only their
imperfect and subjective interpretations to help them bridge the gaps created by
incomplete information. When rationalist explanations posit decision-making
based on information that is, almost by definition, unavailable, 142 they paper over
this fundamental uncertainty with the illusion that individuals have access to the
information that would allow rational calculation to occur.
Game theory's focus on self-interest also gives rise to another interesting
paradox. Within the game, self-interest becomes grounds for rational trust143-in
the real world, however, self-interest is routinely identified as one of the prime
factors undercutting trust generation. 44 In one survey, 26% of respondents
138.

For an allegorical exploration of this claim, see HOLLIS, supra note 63, at 19-

22.
139.
Gambetta, in TRUST MAKING AND BREAKING, supra note 68, at 217; Joyce
Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122, 130-39
(1995) (detailing investment game results with significantly more trust and cooperation than
the Nash equilibrium for the game would predict); Kiyonari et al., supra note 71, at 270-74
(summarizing research); Craig W. Thomas, Maintaining and Restoring Public Trust in
Government Agencies and Their Employees, 30 ADMIN. & SOC. 166, 172-73 (1998); but see
Williamson, supra note 69, at 473 (disputing that these games involve trust at all).
ELSTER, supra note 125, at 146 ("Altruism, trust and solidarity are genuine
140.
phenomena that cannot be dissolved into ultra-subtle forms of self interest."); James, supra
note 132, at 291; see also MOLLERING, supra note 72, at 42-45; Kramer & Tyler, supra note

86, at 5-6 (drawing on moral development literature to support the claim that instrumental
models cannot adequately explain trust).
141.
COLEMAN, supra note 111, at 99 (claiming that the rational actor will trust "if
the ratio of the chance of gain to the chance of loss is greater than the ratio of the amount of
the potential loss to the amount of the potential gain").
See NORTH, supra note 128, at 8 (noting that the version of the rational actor
142.
model premised on complete information has "simply led us astray" because it lacked an
"understanding of the nature of human cooperation and coordination").
See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 1-8 (2004)
143.
(laying out a theory of "encapsulated interest" as a basis for trust); see also Hardin, StreetLevel Epistemology, supra note 62, at 506 (describing encapsulated self-interest as "I trust
you because it is in your interest to do what I trust you to do.").
See, e.g., JANOS BERTOK & ELODIE BETH, OECD OVERVIEW FOR MANAGING
144.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 64-70 (2005) (describing the various self-

interests that governments perceive as creating a conflict of interest sufficient to undermine
a public official's ability to faithfully carry out the public's interest); Robert M. Worcester,
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identified "self-interest" as the main reason they did not trust government and
about half said that people in general could not be trusted because they were "only
looking out for themselves." 145 The mere spectre of the quid pro quo is enough to
compromise the legitimacy of political decision-making and of scientific research.
More fundamentally, game theory starts from the assumption that trust is
an individual and behavioral phenomenon produced by rational machinations of
calculating individuals. 146 This account does not leave room for the social and
normative components of trust, which some argue are its primary attributes. 147 At
the very least, a variety of motivations leads people to trust and/or cooperate in a
plurality of contexts. Games that detach individual decision-making from a social
context are unlikely to reveal the richness of social responses to uncertainty, and
thus are not capturing the full dynamics of trust under those conditions. This
critique does not so much identify a flaw in game theory itself as much as
it
14 8
recognizes the limitations that the methodology imposes on data interpretation.
Despite these caveats, the insights of game theory do provide some
important lessons for understanding the role that trust plays in the regulatory
context. First, there is a very real possibility that rational individual choices lead to
an outcome that does not maximize group welfare. Some activities pit individual
Science and Society: What Scientists and the Public Can Learn from Each Other, in COSMIC
RAYS: ESSAYS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FROM THE ROYAL INSTITUTION 97, 105
(Richard Catlow et al. eds., 2001) (noting that being perceived as an "interested party"
heightened mistrust, particularly of scientists); Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Reality Check:
The Politics of Mistrust, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at Al. See also infra note 215 and
accompanying text.
145.
Washington Post / Kaiser Family Found. / Harvard Univ. Survey Project,
Why Don't Americans Trust The Government? (1996), available at http://www.kff.org/

kaiserpolls/1110-govems.cfm. More recently, the Pew Research Center's 2007 Social

Trends survey reported analogous results, with half of all respondents agreeing that "you
can't be too careful" and 35% stating that people were "just looking out for themselves."
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 13. The Pew survey did not ask the "self-interest" question
explicitly.
146.
According to rational-choice theory, trust enables actors to conserve on
transaction costs because it is the possibility of opportunistic behavior that generates many
transaction costs. See, e.g., L.L. Cummings & Philip Bromiley, The Organizational Trust
Inventory (OTD): Development and Validation, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 302 (Roderick
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 5th ed. 1995) (trust reduces transaction costs in and
between organizations by reducing the need for spending on control, monitoring, and
sanctioning). These theorists seek to explain trust as a matter of incentives subject to
calculation, but they cannot explain away all the uncertainty and vulnerability that
individuals face in making trust decisions. HOLLIS, supra note 63, at 13 ("trusting people to
act in their self-interest is one thing and trusting them to live up to their obligations another.
The former does not capture the bond of society, since the bond relies on trusting people not
to exploit trust.").
147.
See, e.g., Lewis & Weigert, supra note 1, at 976; Thomas, supra note 139, at
172-73.
148.
Alfred Schutz drew out this distinction between the theoretical actions of an
anonymous "anyone" and those of real live individuals acting in contexts. ALFRED SCHUTZ,
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 242-49 (George Walsh & Fredrick Lehnert
Walsh trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1967) (1932).
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and group interests against each other in a fashion that subverts the public good.
Perhaps the most famous example is the Tragedy of the Commons.149 A related
insight is that lack of information can also lead to results that are sub-optimal from
a rational, value-maximizing perspective. Indeed, it is experience with these
phenomena that often leads to regulation in the first place.
Finally, as Russell Hardin asserts, the best condition for humans is an
environment in which they have a "well-founded confidence.' 50 He recognizes,
however, that this is not an individual problem but a collective one. 151 Successful
regulatory decision-making both creates that well-founded confidence' 5 2 and is
successful because that well-founded confidence
reflexively conveys legitimacy on
53
decisions taken in the face of uncertainty.1
D. Social Trust

Social theorists posit an alternative vision of trust based on discursive
processes within civil society. For these theorists, trust is a generative process that
both forms the backdrop for civil society and, at the same time, helps create that
society by facilitating cooperation within and between diverse groups.' 5 4 Social
trust involves a generalized belief in the honesty, integrity, and reliability of
generalized others. 5 5 This kind of trust requires propitious social conditions before
it becomes possible or likely.
The social theorist's approach views individuals as embedded in social
systems, with rules and resources that powerfully constrain or enable individual
interactions. Although, certainly, aspects of these social systems are powerfully
influenced by "thick trust," they depend much more heavily on what Luhmann
called "system trust"' 156 than on interpersonal trust relationships. The reasons for
this are obvious. In the change from a relatively small, face-to-face society to a
demographically large and structurally complicated system, people often interact
149.
(1968).
150.
151.

See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243
Hardin, Street Level Epistemology, supra note 62, at 513.
Id.

152.
As Susan Bandes points out, "the question of how people would address risk
individually differs from the question of how they would like their government to address
collective risks." Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values and the Construction of Risk, 156 U.

L. REv. PENNumbra 421, 423 n. 11 (2008), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/
responses/03-2008/Bandes.pdf. Cass Sunstein similarly makes the point that the preferences
people hold as private individuals differ from their collective judgments. CASS R. SuNSTEIN,
PA.

FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 261 (1997).
153.
A focus on the rational, self-interested individual too often fails to account
for the fact that economic life is deeply embedded in social life. Indeed, a preoccupation
with "the market" has blinded some thinkers to the critical role played by governments,
particularly in creating and running institutions within a society.
154.
To say this is not to assume that any particular institutional formation or
setting as given-indeed, the construction and explanation of those settings is a central
problem in sociology. See, e.g., S.N. EISENSTADT, POWER, TRUST AND MEANING: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND ANALYSIS 1-40 (1995).
155.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 13, at 1.
156.
LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 48-58.
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from a distance that is both physical and social. There is scarcely any form of
activity in modem society that does not require the social collaboration of human
beings who are unknown to each other. As a result, the trust necessary for social
coordination becomes unavoidably institutional rather than intimate. 5 7 This shift
captures some of the same phenomena that have also been attributed to the shift
from status to contract as the organizing principle of social interaction. 158
Without confidence in the functioning and safeguards of social systems
(the monetary system and the legal system are two obvious examples), many of the
most commonplace interactions in a modem society would become extremely
risky and unpredictable. For example, a business willing to accept a check as
payment for service does so in the context of fraud protection in the banking
system and the law of negotiable instruments. This remains true even though it is
highly likely that the business representative does not consciously consider the
soundness of the banking system or the UCC when making this decision. These
social factors act as the invisible social backdrop that generates the social trust that
makes individual trust possible. Institutions and social processes can thus promote
59
(or constrain) trust relationships. 1
Barber emphasized that expectations must be the starting point for
defining and exploring trust.' Thus, in addition to being shaped by the broader
social climate, trust is also heavily influenced by the performance of social
institutions. For example, social trust is an indispensable attribute of an effective
monetary system. Without public trust in the legitimacy of a state's currency as a
holder of value and a medium of exchange, the state's social institutions
disintegrate. Indeed, collapse of trust in the monetary system is often a sign that a
social system is under severe strain.
Social trust offers a legitimizing counterbalance to the risks inherent in an
impersonal social structure built out of dependence on strangers.16 1 At its bottom,
this trust rests on a shared set of constitutive expectations about how people
behave in society.1 62 Beyond this minimal baseline, shared expectations that
contribute to trust derive, at least in part, from the stabilizing influence of social
institutions, particularly the16role
these institutions play in certifying credentials and
3
setting social ground rules.
157.
Warren, supra note 14, at 6.
158.
For an application of this point, see Keith Hart, Kinship Contract and Trust:
The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 178, (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).

159.
This is not to overly idealize trust as a social condition. As Annette Baier
cautions, "[e]xploitation and conspiracy, as much as justice and fellowship thrive better in
an atmosphere of trust." Baier, supra note 58, at 232.
160.
BARBER, supra note 18, at 8-10.
161.
SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 22 (distinguishing trust from faith and from
confidence in the fulfillment of role expectations).
162.
See Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities,
I ISoc. PROBS. 225, 228-31 (1964).
163.
Social trust, as I have framed it, thus differs from Hobbes's Leviathan in that
I am invoking social institutions in their role as expectation generators, and credential
verifiers, rather than as rule enforcers or outcome guarantors.
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Viewed in this light, social institutions provide the system of rules and
meaning that create common expectations, thereby defining individuals as social
actors. 164 In other words, institutions "establish the very criteria by which people
discover their preferences.' 65 This framing assigns an important mediating role to
agencies as social institutions because they occupy the transition points between
social and interpersonal trust. The same individual might have social trust in the
agency itself and personal trust in the agency's representatives with whom that
individual has contact. Ongoing contact with the agency gives rise to a reflexive
feedback loop166-- Giddens calls this the access point or "facework" of the
institution-the point of intersection where personal interactions with an agency's
representative either shore up or erode social trust in the agency as an
institution.' 67 If regulatory agencies were static entities, this point would be much
less significant. But, at the same time that a feedback loop between individuals and
the agency is recreating or modifying social trust in the agency as an institution,
the reflexive agency is also continually reconstructing the basic rules by which it is
constituted and governed.
Social trust thus hinges not on individuals per se, but on the roles those
individuals play within a broader social and economic system. The motivation to
trust is tied to the context in which activities occur rather than to the attributes of
any specific trusted individual. Trust under these circumstances takes the form of
safeguards built into social systems and in the ability of these safeguards to
enforce expectations. Because these safeguards function independently of the
personal motivations of any of the participants at any given time, one can repose
trust in the system itself, instead of being forced to depend wholly on the thick
trust based on individual relationships. 168 Social trust thus provides a means to
resolve, or at least bracket, the contingencies and uncertainties inherent in a
complex society.
By contrast, as social trust erodes, so does trust between members of the
society (though this observation may suffer from a chicken and egg problem).
Either way, trust dynamics are an important component of effective social
action. 169 Experience with individuals can reinforce or undermine social trust in
164.
MOLLERING, supra note 72, at 60-64.
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW
165.
INSTITUTIONALISM INORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell
eds., 1991).
Giddens, supra note 134, at 185; see also PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
166.
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 61 (1966).
In saying this, I am cognizant that "the institution" is also in a state of
167.

reflexive and dynamic equilibrium.
Nor is trust a purely internal psychological function, though obviously there
168.
are psychological dimensions to trust. LUHMANN, supra note 18, at 5; see also BARBER,

supra note 18, at 26-38 (describing how childhood experiences and psychological
conditions shape an individual's ability to participate in social trust systems).
169.
There are, of course, degrees of trust. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman posit
that "trustworthiness should be thought of as a continuum, rather than the trustee being
either trustworthy or not trustworthy." Mayer et al., supra note 72, at 721. The trust
continuum can simultaneously be composed of both individual and social trust because trust
among persons and within society more generally is interconnected. Indeed, there is ample
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institutions and vice versa. It is this interconnectedness that makes trust such a
fragile commodity. 170 Erosion of trust in one context reverberates throughout
society in unpredictable and disruptive waves. The presence or absence of social
trust not only influences the choices that individuals and societies actually make,
but also shapes the array of choices they could possibly make. By shaping the
possible, this kind of trust both limits and enables social interactions and describes
the boundaries of social resilience.

III. REGULATORY TRUST
As uncertainty erodes traditional bases of administrative authority, the
weaknesses that limit thick trust and rational calculation as tools for constructing
and maintaining social resilience rapidly become more than theoretical. Neither
nostalgia for an idealized past in which thick trust presumably flourished, 7 ' nor
cynical reductions of trust to just another strategic calculative decision, offer a true
picture of how the complex phenomenon we call trust influences regulatory
choices. Instead, social trust, what Luhmann refers to as "system trust,"1 72 becomes
a critical backdrop for understanding regulatory trust.
Although many components contribute to the construction of social

trust, 173 this analysis focuses on the three that are most relevant to trust in the
administrative context: expertise, stewardship, and transparency. Together, these

three attributes make up "regulatory trust," which I conceive as a specialized
subset of social trust. The interplay of these three trust dimensions creates the
context in which administrative decisions are made, and thus offers the possibility
of public trust (or not) in regulatory decisions.
These regulatory trust components flow organically from previous
scholarly work on trust,1 74 but reflect the sui generis attributes of administrative
evidence that trust is dynamic rather than static-it develops, builds, declines, and
resurfaces over the course of time. An inability to accommodate this dynamism is one of the
major criticisms leveled at prisoner's dilemma games. See Rousseau et al., supra note 57, at
395.
170.
Roger E. Kasperson et al., Social Distrust as a Factorin Siting Hazardous
Facilitiesand CommunicatingRisk, 48 J. Soc. ISSUES 161, 170 (1992). In a Hobbesian state

of nature, the potential costs of misplaced trust overwhelm the potential advantages of wellplaced trust. Under this view, the role of government is to reduce the costs of misplaced
trust and thus make cooperation possible.
FUKUYAMA, supra note 55, at 23-41.
171.
LuHMANN, supra note 18, at 48-58 (identifying institutions and their
172.
processes as a source of social trust in modern societies).
For a more in-depth exploration of the components of system trust, see
173.
Zucker, supra note 74, at 53.
174.
Scholars working in this area seem to have a marked partiality for tripartite
conceptions of trust. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, for example, propose that trust is a
function of the trustor's propensity to trust combined with the trusted party's perceived
ability, benevolence, and integrity. Mayer et al., supra note 72, at 717-20. This formulation
owes much to Barber's tripartite formula of fiduciary obligation, technically competent
performance, and constant social conditions. BARBER, supra note 18, at 9-16. More

recently, M6llering describes the traits that generate trust as being "able, willing and
consistent."

MOLLERfNG,

supra note 72, at 48. Ruscio similarly reflects this theme when he
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decision-making. Thus, expertise means not only demonstrable technical mastery,
but also a keen appreciation of the limits of expertise and an ability to work
respectfully with diverse groups. Stewardship includes not only consistency in
fulfilling expectations across time and fair decision-makiig processes, but also a
profound receptiveness to the diversity of public concerns. Transparency involves
more than merely the provision of accurate and useful information; it also includes
a commitment to capacity-building and an active solicitation of plural voices.
Mapping the contours of regulatory trust is an important first step toward
understanding how to construct, nurture, and maintain it. First of all, trust
interactions with a regulatory system are different from interactions between
individuals. While an individual may be quite savvy in interpersonal matters, those
same competencies do not necessarily come into play, for example, in choosing to
take a drug regulated by the FDA. Moreover, the public is inherently vulnerable to
the combined effects of a multitude of decisions made by individuals, none of
whom are likely to have considered the cumulative or synergistic possibilities of
their activities.
Regulation is intended to bridge both of these kinds of vulnerability-the
inability of individuals to assess their vulnerability vis-h-vis a particular regulatory
decision and the vulnerability of the public's interest to the cumulative effects of
private decisions. The role of regulation in this context is to fill these gaps and
create a social foundation upon which individuals can rely.1 75 As a result,
regulatory trust must necessarily be more socially oriented than the individual
value maximization posited by rational choice, but at the same time less intimate
than the dense interpersonal relationships of thick trust.
Regulatory failures like those that permitted the sale of tainted heparin,
lead-contaminated toys, and inappropriate sub prime mortgages to unwitting
consumers-to highlight just a few examples from recent headlines-highlight
regulatory trust's fragility. These failures, and others, seem to transgress a basic
ground rule that frames the regulatory state-the displacement of caveat emptor
with a cultural presumption that society and manufacturers have a duty to produce

describes political trust as "weaving together judgments of the integrity and capability of
public officials with confidence in the institutional structures in which they operate."
Kenneth P. Ruscio, Jay's Pirouette, or Why Political Trust is Not the Same as Personal
Trust, 31 ADMIN. & SoC'Y 639, 640-41 (1999). Zucker posits that trust has two basic sets of
components: a shared set of background expectations, including a shared interpretive frame,
and a shared set of constitutive expectations, including fiduciary responsibility and
competence in the task at hand. Zucker, supra note 74, at 57-59. For all of these thinkers,
Garfinkel's famous breaching experiments are the touchstone for the proposition that
background assumptions shape social discourse. See Garfinkel, supra note 162.
175.
President Obama's choice to head the EPA invoked this role for trust in her
first memorandum to EPA staff. Memorandum from Lisa Jackson, Adm'r. of EPA,
to EPA Employees (Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/administrator/

memotoemployees.html ("[plublic trust in the Agency demands that we reach out to all
stakeholders fairly and impartially, that we consider the views and data presented carefully
and objectively, and that we fully disclose the information that forms the bases for our
decisions").
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and market safe products. 176 One consequence of this transgression has been the
erosion of social trust in regulation and regulators. For example, as a result of
many of the failures listed above, the 7Pew
Research Center documents that trust in
7
FDA plummeted from 1996 to 2006.1
This data gives us some insight into the contours of regulatory trust. For
such trust to exist, the public must be satisfied, not only with a decisionmaker's
technical qualifications, but also with the regulatory agency's motivations, and its
ability to construct an administrative system that will function as intended.
Regulatory trust therefore necessarily includes a focus on agency deliberation,
judgment, and procedures.
Properly structured and supported, regulatory trust can help a society
retain its resilience. At the same time, abuse or malfunctioning of any of regulatory
trust's components also has the potential to undermine overall social trust. This
vulnerability is compounded because agencies are typically making decisions that
involve the exercise of discretion in the face of uncertainties. Where there is room
for the exercise of discretion there is also the possibility that agency decisionmaking may deviate from the components that underpin regulatory trust. This
possibility creates a gap in social relations-an
open space between systemically
1 78
defined expectations and agency discretion.
Although expertise, stewardship, and transparencyare interrelated, each
deserves thorough consideration on its own merits. The Sections that follow map
out the contours of each regulatory trust component in some detail, giving special
attention to how my characterization expands on or diverges from the current trust
literature.
A. Expertise

79

The current American administrative system has its roots in the
Progressive Era belief in technocratic administration-that expertise and insulation
from the political process would produce better decision-making. 180 Bom during a
EISENSTADT, supra note 154, at 147-55.
177.
In its 1996 nationwide survey, the Pew Research Center reported that the
FDA received an overall favorable rating of over 80%, more than twice the approval rate of
the entire government. By 2006, that rating had plummeted to 29%.
178.
For an explanation of role expectation and trust, see SELIGMAN, supra note 6,

176.

at 24-25; see also BARBER, supra note 18, at 16-17 (cautioning that trust must always be

measured against the relevant social system because different role expectations for an
individual may arise from differing social relationships).
179.
Like trust, defining expertise is a thorny project. There are almost as many
definitions of "expert" as there are researchers studying the topic. For purposes of this
discussion, it is enough to point out that the idea of expertise is often contested.
180.
There is a wealth of literature on the rise of expert administration during the
Progressive Era. See, e.g.,

JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920
(1986); THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 17-44, 60-65 (1984); ROBERT H.
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967); Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal

Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68

MINN.

L. REv. 299, 306-07

(1983) (describing the New Deal Era view that advised deference to agencies' expertise);
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time of spectacular technological innovation, this system grew from the belief that
new forms of governmental oversight were needed to respond to challenges that
were rapidly reshaping society. Scholars and policymakers answered these
challenges with the "science of administration."'181 Steeped in visions of efficiency
and expertise, these policymakers presumed that the way to produce superior law
and policy was to adopt the correct legal and administrative processes. According
to this vision, regulators exercised authority that was delegated to them because of
their presumed expertise. Their credentials as experts were both what qualified
them to make decisions and what cloaked their decisions with social legitimacy.
Presumptions about the peculiar competencies of administrative agencies
continue to resonate, even alongside the growing recognition that many
purportedly technocratic decisions are, in fact, deeply political. 8 2 These
perceptions of agency expertise are crucial for regulatory trust.'83 Many exercises
of regulatory power-ranging from licensing schemes that allocate scarce public
resources to policing schemes intended to correct market failures to regulations
intended to create or preserve public goods-place expert judgment at the center of
the regulatory enterprise. 8 4 Indeed, a predominant (though by no means the only)
justification for administrative agencies rests on the desirability of technocratic
decision-making-the tantalizing prospect of expert judgment insulated from the
winds of politics. 185 For these reasons, the expertise component of regulatory trust
is probably the most familiar-indeed issues of scientific validity and expertise
have routinely been a focus of discussions about regulatory legitimacy.
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113, 126-27 (1982);
Dorothy Ross, Modernist Social Science in the Land of the New/Old, in MODERNIST
IMPULSES INTHE HUMAN SCIENCES, 1870-1930 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994). A modem revival
of this vision of technocratic expertise can be found in STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61-63 (1993) (advocating

establishment of a cadre of experts to bring economic and scientific rationality to the
writing of regulations). For an articulation of this vision contemporaneous with the
formation of the regulatory state, see VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ch. 3 (1945) (advancing the "social contract of science" vision of
science untainted by political or industrial concerns).
181.
GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE v (1924).

182.
Some argue that the principle of Chevron deference straddles this divide.
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV.L.
REV. 1511, 1516-41 (1992); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law &

Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 823 (1990) (proposing, but rejecting, this view).
183.
See, e.g., Paul Busch & David T. Wilson, An Experimental Analysis of a
Salesman's Expert and Referent Bases of Social Power in the Buyer-Seller Dyad, 13 J.

MARKET. RES. 3, 10 (1976) (reporting the importance of perceptions of expertise to trust
development).
184.
For a thorough overview of the development of administrative law in the
United States, see Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN.

L. REV. 1189 (1986).
185.
For an early and influential articulation of this vision, see JAMES MCCAULEY
LANDIS,

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). The United States Supreme Court extolled

the virtues of agency expertise in a line of cases starting with NLRB v. HearstPubl'ns Inc.,
322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
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Expert opinion alone can neither establish regulatory trust nor
demonstrate legitimate decision-making. While there are certainly aspects of the
use and manipulation of technical knowledge that are wholly or predominantly the
realm of expertise,' 86 most regulatory decisions are deeply embedded in a
normative context. There is often enough uncertainty in the predictive powers of
science to support different and widely diverging characterizations of risk. The
tendency of agencies to cast their decisions as purely scientific or technocratic
elides a critical distinction between science and policy 187-between interpreting
data and choosing among alternative social paths. These latter decisions are not
technical decisions to be left wholly to the expert.' 88 While such decisions are
informed by science, they are at bottom social and political decisions-choices
about the kind of society we will create and the values that society will seek to
maximize.
The primary argument against public participation rests on the notion that
the public prioritizes the "wrong" concerns. The theory is that by "leaving risk
management to experts, who know the issue better than anyone else, society
benefits."' 89 John Graham, former head of the White House Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) exemplified this vision of regulation-with risk
decisions based on criteria drawn exclusively from economic and scientific
spheres.' 90
The problem with this argument is that decisions about new technologies
and, indeed, many other regulatory decisions made under conditions of uncertainty
are value-laden at every turn.' 91 They can be resolved only by exercises of
normative judgment. Ulrich Beck makes this point, albeit more poetically, when he
points out: "[r]isks flaunt and boast with mathematics,'' 92 offering only
186.
See Lindsay Prior, Belief Knowledge and Expertise: The Emergence of the
Lay Expert in Medical Sociology, 25 SOC. ILLNESS &HEALTH 41, 41-46 (2003).
187.
See Borgmann, JudicialEvasion, supra note 38, at 35-40.
188.
Scholars make this argument across a multitude of administrative contexts.
For a thorough exploration, in the welfare reform context, see Wendy A. Bach, Welfare
Reform, Privatizationand Power, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 299-304 (2009); Matthew Diller,
Form and Substance in the Privatizationof Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739,
1757 (2002) (arguing that the embrace of purportedly technocratic decision-making
techniques can be a deliberate attempt to shield policy-making from public scrutiny).
189.
RAGNAR E. LOFSTEDT, RISK MANAGEMENT IN POST-TRUST SOCIETIES 23
(2009). This thinking dates back at least two decades. See, e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus,
Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 Sci. 1026, 1026-28 (1983); William D. Ruckelshaus,
Science, Risk and Democracy, 1 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 19-38 (1985).
190.
See, e.g., JOHN GRAHAM & J.K. HARTWELL, THE GREENING OF INDUSTRY: A
RISK MANAGMENT APPRAISAL 1-2 (1997); JOHN GRAHAM & JONATHAN WEINER, RISK
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).

191.
For a description of the various assumptions built into a decision to approve
genetically engineered Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) crops, see generally Rebecca Bratspies,
The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty,and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 325-36 (2002).
192.
BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION, supra note 5, at 9. Beck goes on to
add, "It is possible to chase away critics with a risk approaching zero today, only to bemoan
the stupidity of the public tomorrow, after the catastrophe has happened, for
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probabilities and ruling nothing out. Invoking science and expertise, without
acknowledging the normative judgments inherent in interpreting those
probabilities, further exacerbates the erosion of social trust. Once we cease
constructing probabilities and begin assessing how various regulatory choices help
or hinder construction of the good society in light of those probabilities, we have
left the realm of science for that of policy. As such, resort to expert opinions
and/or data generated by scientists cannot, by itself, provide answers.
"Splitting-off' expert cultures 193 from the contexts in which they exist
does a disservice to decision-making, particularly where uncertainty blurs the
boundaries between "specialised knowledge and its multiple, many-layered (and
often unforeseeable) context of implication.0 94 To be capable of generating trust,
regulatory decisions, and the decision process itself, must fully reflect that
context. 195 Indeed, use of the label of "expert" under these circumstances
presupposes a shared commitment to a joint frame of reference, a proposition that
is by no means self-evident.1 96 Skepticism about expert decision-making has been
underscored by increasing discomfort with decision-making in which
indispensable knowledge is accessible only to the few.
A great challenge for regulatory decision-making is striking an
appropriate balance between expertise, lay opinion, and context. In striking that
balance in a fashion conducive to regulatory trust, agency experts face two central
but somewhat contradictory challenges. Experts, and those who rely upon them,
must learn to be mindful of the limits of their professional expertise.197 Part of that
mindfulness must be a willingness to learn from lay opinion, but to do so without
valorizing as "the wisdom of the people" that which is actually nothing more than
fear or rumor. 198 At the same time, regulatory legitimacy demands that the
underlying science be carefully insulated from overtly political interference.
misunderstanding probability statements." Id.
193.
HABERMAS, supra note 31, at 398-99.
194.
Helga Nowotny, Democratising Expertise and Socially Robust Knowledge,
30 SCI. & PUB. POL'Y. 151, 152 (2003).
195.
Barber calls this the continuation of the expected moral order. BARBER,
supra note 18, at 10-14.
196.
Sameer Ashar makes this point in his work on the radical democratic vision
embedded in social movement lawyering. Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and
Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879, 1923-25 (2007). Other scholars exploring
this point include LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 10305 (2001); Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist:Community Campaigns,
Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133, 2142-49 (2007).
197.
For an interesting exploration of this point, see Elena Baylis, TribunalHopping With the Post-ConflictJustice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 361 (2008).
198.
I am indebted to Tony Arnold for raising the point that a "dominant part of
an environmental and social justice movement has called into question the fundamental
trustworthiness of scientific, legal, and regulatory experts, regardless of the process's
transparency." Personal Communication from Tony Arnold to Rebecca Bratspies (on file
with the author). This is indeed a challenge to the construction of regulatory trust. But, I do
not believe it insoluble, so long as there is a genuine commitment to recognizing that lay
expertise is also a vital and indispensable part of the regulatory process. See, e.g., Luke W.
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These interrelated challenges pose what H.L.A. Hart might call a rule of
recognition problem 199-in a world of increasing contingency, who are the
experts? With increased social complexity has come a contemporaneous
recognition of unique spheres of expertise. Typically, signals of expertise include
credentials, job titles, and reputation. But, as complexity increases, so does the
tendency to divide the world up into smaller and increasingly specialized slivers,
each with its own set of expert signals, credentials, titles, and reputations. 20 0 At the
same time, the critical role that credentials play in establishing expertise has
produced a cottage industry selling such credentials for a fee. 20 ' A proliferation of
meaningless credentials tarnishes the very idea of "the expert" as it becomes
increasingly difficult20 2to establish where actual expertise ends and political
maneuvering begins.
Much research has shown that within their narrow area of expertise,
experts offer more accurate predictions than novices, but outside of that area, they
are just as prone to error, inaccuracy, and misunderstanding as any other citizen. 0 3
Experts, as well as lay people, gather and evaluate data in light of their implicit
assumptions about how the world works. Lay persons sometimes identify
problems and solutions that experts, immersed as they are in their own
professional islands, tend to overlook.2 4

Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental
Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992). See also Jason Corburn, EnvironmentalJustice,
Local Knowledge, and Risk: The Discourse of a Community-Based Cumulative Exposure
Assessment, 29 ENVTL. MGMT. 451 (2002); Tara J. Melish, Maximum FeasibleParticipation
of the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources
ofPoverty, 22 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. (forthcoming 2009).
199.
HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-99 (2d ed.

1994).
200.
As June Carbone points out, when elites disagree, society experiences
increased uncertainty. Personal Communication from June Carbone to Rebecca Bratspies
(on file with author).
201.
For example, there are a plethora of sites online offering PhD's for "life
experience" (and a fee, of course). Some even include an "award of excellence" in the
package. See, e.g., Belford University PhD Program, http://www.belforduniversity.org/
university/doctorateprogram.asp#3 (last visited June 18, 2009).
202.
See Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and the Political
Acknowledgment of Risk, 119 DAEDALUS 61, 76 (1990) (pointing out that many organized
interests have both the incentive and the ability to present their representatives as experts
and to create accounts of risk that have plausible support in available information). The
Tobacco Institute is perhaps the best known example of this use of expertise.
203.

JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

304 (6th

ed. 2004) (concluding that chess masters "do not appear to be better thinkers for all their
genius in chess"); PHILIP EDWARD SLATrER, BUILDING EXPERT SYSTEMS: COGNITIVE
EMULATION 41 (1987) (reviewing literature and asserting that expert thinking is domain
adapted); James Shanteau, How Much Information Does an Expert Use? Is it Relevant?, 81
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 75, 86 (1992) (concluding that it is difficult, if not impossible, for

decision researchers to draw generalizations about experts without reference to specific
problem domains); see also JAMES

SUROWIECKI,

THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 31-34 (2004)

(asserting that experts routinely overestimate the likelihood that they are right).
204.
Bjom K. Myskja, Lay Expertise: Why Involve the Public in Biobank
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An example from the agricultural biotechnology context highlights this
point. In the mid-1990s agricultural biotechnology companies sought regulatory
permission to market genetically engineered varieties of corn. 20 5 These novel
varieties had been genetically modified so that the plants endogenously produced
Bt-a pesticide ordinarily found in soil bacteria. Because the Bt pesticide is toxic
to certain Lepidoptera pests, 20 6 the theory was that genetically engineered Bt corn
20 7
varietals would be subject to less insect damage and therefore more productive.
When deciding whether to approve this Bt corn, regulators needed to assess the
environmental impacts of permitting release of these novel organisms. ° 8 Among
the most obvious of those impacts was the possibility that the target pest
populations would rapidly develop resistance to the Bt pesticide. 20 9 Resistance is a
phenomenon that has plagued pesticide users and producers for decades. 2'0 As
such, it is a problem about which expert regulators should have been fully
cognizant.
Rather than address the resistance issue head on, regulatory experts
instead decided that initial plantings of Bt corn were likely to be relatively diffuse,
and therefore unlikely to pose a risk for evolution of resistance.2 1 1 The agencies
Governance?, 3 GENOMICS SOC. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2006).
205.
See Bacillus thuringiensis Subspecies Kurstaki CyIA(c) and the Genetic

Material Necessary for its Production in all Plants; Exemption from the Requirement of a
Tolerance, 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2002).
206.
Bt toxins act by disrupting the function of the insects' digestive systems,
thereby killing the insects. The insects susceptible to particular strains of Bt include, inter
alia, European corn borer, southwestern corn borer, tobacco budworm, cotton bollworm,
pink bollworm, and Colorado potato beetle. See J.F. Witkowski et al., Bt Corn & European
Corn Borer: Long-Term Success Through Resistance Management (K.R. Ostlie et al. eds.,
1997), availableat http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/cropsystems/DC7055.html.
207.
See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Now OR NEVER: SERIOUS NEW PLANS
TO SAVE A NATURAL PEST CONTROL app. A (Margaret Mellon & Jane Rissler eds., 1998).
208.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BIOPESTICIDEs REGISTRATION ACTION DOCUMENT:
BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS (BT) PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS (Oct. 15, 2001),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/bt-brad.htm.

209.
See FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel, Final Report of the FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel Subpanel on Plant Pesticides Meeting held March 1, 1995; Bruce E.
Tabashnik, Evolution of Resistance to Bacillus Thuringiensis, 39 ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY
47, 47-74, 79 (1994); Fred Gould, The Evolutionary Potential of Crop Pests, 79 AM.
SCIENTIST 496, 501-02 (1991). See generally D.N. Alstad & D.A. Andow, Managing the
Evolution of Insect Resistance to Transgenic Plants, 268 SCI. 1894 (1995); Richard T.
Roush, Managing Pests and Their Resistance to Bacillus thuringiensis: Can Transgenic
CropsBe Better than Sprays?, 4 BIOCONTROL ScI. &TECH. 501, 502-03 (1994).
210.
See George P. Georghiou, The Magnitude of the Resistance Problem, in
PESTICIDE RESISTANCE: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR MANAGEMENT 14 (Comm. on

Strategies for the Mgmt. of Pesticide Resistant Pest Populations, Bd. on Agric., Nat'l
Research Council ed., 1986).
211.
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY TO PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND COLLATERAL RELIEF CONCERNING THE
REGISTRATION AND USE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS EXPRESSING BACILLUS
THURINGIENSIS ENDOTOXINS 90 (Apr. 19, 2000); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA AND
USDA POSITION PAPER ON INSECT RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT IN BT CROPS (July 12, 1999)

[hereinafter EPA AND USDA POSITION PAPER].
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used this critical assumption about likely adoption patterns to avoid dealing with
the resistance problem. 212 Unfortunately, this assumption was wrong-adoption
was instead densely clustered in areas with particular infestations of corn borer
pests. 213 An honest mistake? Maybe, but a completely avoidable one. The nature of
a corn borer infestation made it overwhelmingly likely that farmer adoption of the
new technology would instead be clustered. Had the regulatory decisionmakers
included farmer perspectives as part of their planning process they would never
have made such an obvious error. As one farmer said, "If my neighbor plants Bt
[corn], I'd better plant it too; otherwise I get the corn borers. 214
This example highlights how lay knowledge can be an important
2 5
supplement to expert knowledge in the process of solving regulatory problems.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency to give the opinion of an "expert" significant
weight in public discourse, even when the opinion concerns matters beyond (and
sometimes only distantly related to) the person's area of expertise. This "expert
haloing" creates problems for those endeavoring to construct regulatory trust. First,
216
the lines of expertise can become blurred when professional fields overlap.
Moreover, because the experts themselves tend to overestimate the importance of
their field of expertise and to underestimate what other perspectives might
contribute, they are often blind to certain types of uncertainty. 217 Brian Wynne's
work documenting the disastrously wrong advice that so-called experts provided to
Cumbrian sheepherders in the wake of Chernobyl highlights how prone experts are
212.

For a full discussion of this point, see Bratspies, supra note 191, at 332-37.

213.
EPA AND USDA POSITION PAPER, supra note 211.
214.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, EPA/USDA
WORKSHOP ON BT CROP RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT 36 (June 18, 1999) (on file with author).
215.
Lay knowledge can also be a wholly independent source of knowledgestanding outside the particular, privileged form of experience that is labeled "expert
knowledge," the lay person is uniquely positioned to raise foundational questions, the kind
of questioning those immersed in the field tend not to do. Myskja, supra note 204, at 6.
216.
For example, by the late 1980s, climate researchers had concluded with
surprising unanimity that the increased releases of greenhouse gases from human activities
could significantly raise the earth's temperature in the next century. Stephen H. Schneider,
The Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy, 243 ScI. 771, 771 (1989). Yet two decades
later, so-called experts (albeit not climatologists) are still opining to the contrary, spawning
a cottage industry contending that the connection was not proven. The Union of Concerned
Scientists has written extensively about the role of oil and coal companies in underwriting
the activities of global warming skeptics. The UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE,

MIRRORS & HOT AIR: How EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO'S TACTICS TO
MANUFACTURE
UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE
SCIENCE (2007),
available at
www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/globalwarming/exxon.report.pdf.
This report, and
similar information about the funding of various global warming skeptic institutions,
underscores my earlier point about self-interest compromising trustworthiness. Union of
Concerned Scientists, Global Warming Skeptic Organizations (2005), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/global-warming-contrarians/
global-warming-skeptic.html.
217.
See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen
Participationin Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223 (2003) [hereinafter Jasanoff, Citizen
Participation];SLATTER, supra note 203, at 37 (describing the tendency of experts to take
their own lack of knowledge about a hypothesis as evidence of its falsity).
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to the pitfall of not realizing that they do not understand certain aspects of a
problem.21 s To drive home the significance of this point, Wynne calls this
blindness "ignorance.,, 2 19 Not only are experts vulnerable to many of the same
ingrained cognitive biases that plague lay persons, but' 22their
status as experts makes
0
them, as Holly Doremus points out, "prone to hubris.

Moreover, expert analytic frameworks can erect high barriers to
participating in the social dialogue at all. 22' Legitimate positions and voices not
facile with the dominant discourse, and thus unable to fit into it, are often
excluded. 2 Along the same lines, turf wars between professional subcultures
within an agency-say between lawyers and economists-can also create
bureaucratic obstacles that hinder the effective incorporation of diverse
perspectives in the decision-making process. Democratizing expertise thus serves
twin goals: it helps overcome the expert haloing problem while also expanding
participation in public decision-making. The combination of these two effects
creates a better regulatory process. 3
218.
Brian Wynne, Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and
Public Uptake of Science, 1 PUB. UNDERSTANDING Sci. 281, 283-87 (1992). Wynne
describes the inconsistency between "the certainty pervading public scientific statements
and the uncertainties involved in actually attempting to create definite scientific knowledge
in ... novel and open-ended circumstances." Id. at 293. Unfortunately, "unwillingness to
reflect on the status of their own knowledge" can obscure significant gaps in information.
Id. at 298. For example, the information gaps about the chronic and long-term effects of
many hazardous chemicals were discovered only after entire populations and ecosystems
had been exposed to the hazards. Before disaster struck, regulators did not appreciate the
need for this information. See Jasanoff, Citizen Participation,supra note 217, at 234.
219.
See Wynne, supra note 218, at 295-97.
220.
Holly Doremus, Precaution,Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural
Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REv. 547, 567 (2007). Sheila Jasanoff asserts that
modem societies have devoted inordinate resources to developing "technologies of hubris."
Jasanoff, Citizen Participation,supra note 217, at 238.
221.
This observation fits with Michel Foucault's assertion that "[t]here is no
knowledge without a particular discursive practice and any discursive practice may be
defined by the knowledge it forms." BARRY SMART & MICHEL FOUCAULT: CRITICAL
ASSESSMENTS 74 (1994) (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
183 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969)).
222.
Jasanoff, Citizen Participation,supra note 217, at 239. For an empirical
documentation of this form of exclusion, see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices In Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 553, 565-74 (1992) (describing courtroom dynamics that systematically, if not
necessarily intentionally, silence tenant voices). Gerald Torres describes the central
importance of narratives, and emphasizes that mistranslation between different narrative
frames can hinder consideration of particular viewpoints. Gerald Torres, Translation and
Stories, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1378-82 (2002) (using Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), as an example). Jerome Bruner points out
that steries can reveal competing normative assumptions about how the world should work.
JEROME BRUNER, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION

130-31 (1996).

223.
Along these lines, a cornerstone of the European Union's 2001 White Paper
on Governance was a plan to democratize expertise by adopting new guidelines "on
collection and use of expert advice in the Commission to provide for the accountability,
plurality and integrity of the expertise used." Commission of the European Communities,
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Pointing out the complementary nature between realms of expert and lay
knowledge is not to deny the importance of expertise. Recognizing that there is a
grain of truth in characterizing expertise and "expert culture, 224 as an ideology is
not necessarily a slippery slope to believing that expert knowledge is merely
"ideology masquerading as neutral fact."225 Instead, this insight makes it possible
to begin the process of reconceptualizing the relationship between science,
expertise, and governance.
With causation often opaque, valuations uncertain, and the scope and
magnitude of risks contested, any serious attempt to build regulatory trust must
satisfy the cross-pressures for both expert decision-making and citizen
participation. The following Sections on stewardship and transparency suggest
some thoughts about how to achieve the latter, while still preserving an appropriate
respect for expertise. This balancing act begins with a predicate question-what
framework should be used to interpret facts relevant to a decision about social
welfare? This is not a scientific question-it is not about the facts, but about their
interpretation.2 26 For example, in deciding whether to permit a polluting activity,
should the regulatory focus be on the activity's benefits or on its harms? While the
answer is obviously both, the question has important repercussions for what gets
labeled a harm or a benefit, and thus influences the calculation.
Regulatory assessments are never solely factual calculations. It is not
possible to consider all potential harms and benefits--choices must be made.
Those choices are influenced by the regulators' evaluative assumptions about the
kinds of outcomes that are alterable as opposed to inevitable, the kinds of risks that
are acceptable, and the factors that are most relevant in making these assessments.
Decisionmakers can focus their evaluation narrowly on economic benefits and
harms or can consider the broader social context in which these economic benefits
and harms occur; for example, who bears the risks of which harms and who stands
to benefit? Each alternative offers a perfectly legitimate matrix for assessing the
proposed activity, based on privileging a different set of values and a different
decisional framework. Much depends on the internal dynamics of the agency. The
choice between alternative framings is a political one-merely by deciding which

European Governance: A White Paper COM 19 (July 25, 2001), available at http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_O428enOl.pdf.
Some
scholars
challenge the premise of this White Paper-the notion that increased participation
represents democratization, at least in the context of the European Union. See, e.g., JEAN
MONNET CTR. FOR INT'L & REG'L ECON. LAW & JUSTICE, Symposium, Mountain or
Molehill? A CriticalAppraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance (Working

Paper
No.
6/01)
(presenting
an
array
of views),
available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/O1/0060 l.html; see also Ludger Radermacher,
The European Commission's White Paper on European Governance: The Uneasy
Relationship Between Public Participation and Democracy, GERMAN L.J, Jan. 1, 2002,
availableat http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/article.php?id=125.
224.
HABERMAS,supra note 31, at 330.

225.

This view is typically credited to Michel Foucault. See

ROBERT P. CREASE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERTISE

EVAN SELINGER

&

163 (2006).

226.
For an eloquent presentation of this point, see Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies
of Humility, 450 NATURE 33 (2007).
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harms and benefits will be evaluated and compared in making a regulatory
decision, we have already crossed into the realm of policy.
Common regulatory tactics bury rather than surface these choices. For
example, the common technique of reducing costs and benefits to dollars and then
comparing those dollar figures (quantitative cost-benefit analysis) implicitly
represents that this information is both available and reliable. These cost and
benefit estimates are steeped in uncertainty, even though the approach depends on
the relevant costs and benefits being precisely quantifiable. Scholars have written
volumes making the case that costs not readily quantified are often inappropriately
disregarded.227 When cost and benefit estimates are inaccurate or missing, the
output of such an analysis becomes meaningless, while still conveying the illusion
228
Such techniques can therefore produce incorrect and
of numerical precision. 22
misleading policy recommendations.229 Yet these process concerns are not
systematically incorporated into the everyday decision-making of agency staff, nor
are they considered in the regulatory process on a consistent, rather than an ad hoc,
basis.
This kind of cost-benefit analysis also tends to assume that, once
monetized, harms and benefits are fungible: reducing individuals to statistics and
their experience to aggregate numerical risk calculations. This approach takes
ignores the social foundations of vulnerability and does not consider that certain
social groups are often allocated multiple risks from which they receive very little
benefit. As a result, this kind of analysis actually reduces society's ability to
227.
See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 205-34 (2004); MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 170-72 (1988); David Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit

Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2042-69 (1998); Amy Sinden, In Defense of
Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1413-23 (2005).
For example, in 2006, the Office of Management and Budget proposed
228.
requiring that quantitative risk assessment be used to assess, prioritize, and characterize risk
whenever possible. Among the more controversial parts of this proposal were a series of
required default assumptions, and a mandated "central" or expected risk estimate, that was
to be developed by averaging risk estimates even in the face of significant model
uncertainty.

OFFICE OF MGMT.

&

BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN

17

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
at
available
(2006),
proposed risk assessmentbulletin_ 010906.pdf. For an analysis of how this proposal
politicized risk assessment, see Sidney Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk
Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083, 1099-1101 (2007). The National Science Council issued a
report panning OMB's proposal as "fundamentally flawed" and recommended that the
proposal be withdrawn because it "could not be rescued." NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., SCIENTIFIC
REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT

1-7 (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=l 1811. In
the face of blistering criticism, OMB withdrew the proposal.
229.
For an example of how this might happen, see ANNE-SOPHIE CREPIN, BEIJER
AND BUDGET

INT'L INST. OF ECOLOGICAL ECON., THRESHOLD EFFECTS IN CORAL REEF FISHERIES, 23-27

(2003) (pointing out that mistakes about parameter values under conditions of uncertainty
can skew results toward suboptimal options), available at http://www.gruponahise.com/
eaere2003/POSTERS/CREPIN.pdf.
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230
include issues of distributive justice and overall fairness in the decisional mix.
Even worse, the disconnect between fuzzy inputs and precisely calculated outputs
promotes a corrosive public cynicism about the decision-making process itself.
Not only are these questions empirically and normatively complex, they have no
definitive, value-neutral answers. To build regulatory trust we must not pretend
that they do. We must not privilege efficiency at the expense of other values but
must instead engage in an important social conversation about the acceptability of
risks.

B. Stewardship
The manner in which regulatory decision-making occurs can have
tremendous impact on levels of social trust in regulators and regulation. At its best,
regulatory decision-making is informed by caring, ethics, and integrity. This ethos
has been variously labeled the "ascription of benign intent, ''23' a "belief in the
goodwill of the other,, 232 and "fiduciary responsibility. '233 All these
characterizations are getting at aspects of what I am calling stewardship-a
building block of regulatory trust.
Stewardship suggests an aspiration to more than mere efficiency and
professionalism, the conventional measures for successful agency action. This is
not to suggest that efficiency and professionalism are undesirable attributes in
regulatory decision-making but instead to highlight that regulatory trust demands
more than mere competence from regulators. Only by building a consistent track
record of fulfilling long-term commitments and respecting constituents 234 can
regulators credibly claim to be stewards of the public's interest. This includes
agency stewardship of the public's long-term interests in building a sustainable
and just society-interests that are too often lost in the multitude of private, shortterm decisions. When decisionmakers evince a clear commitment to those longterm interests even as they respond to near-term concerns, their communications,
even under conditions of uncertainty, carry greater credibility. That credibility, in
turn, facilitates trust.
Inclusive and rigorous processes are a baseline stewardship
requirement-for both symbolic and practical reasons. On a symbolic level,
inclusive decision-making processes signal the agency's desire and intention to be
trustworthy; on a practical level, such decision-making processes create a shared
230.
Recent attempts to reduce the assumed value of a human life in calculating
costs and benefits, a change that would obviously reduce the benefits attributable to health
and safety regulation, graphically reveal how malleable cost-benefit analysis can be.
ACKERMAN & HE1NZERLING, supra note 227, at 61-90. As such, it provides a cautionary tale
about the damage and deception that can be wrought through undue focus on monetizing
costs and benefits. For a defense of these techniques, see John D. Graham, Managing the
Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953
(2006).
231.

John Dunn, Trust and PoliticalAgency, in TRUST:
ed., 1988).

COOPERATIVE RELATIONs 73-74, (Diego Gambetta
232.
SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 43.
233.
BARBER,supra note 18, at 14-16.

234.

Mayer et al., supra note 72, at 719-21.
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investment in regulatory policy, and set expectations about fulfillment and
maintenance of regulatory promises. 35 Participatory experiments along this line
have been tried in Denmark, to significant, albeit not unanimous, acclaim.2 36 When
successful, such programs create a mutual learning process that enhances
democratic legitimacy of regulatory decision-making and improves the actual
decisions themselves. This kind of participatory process also supplies the requisite
"world in common" that sociological research tells us is necessary for trust. 2 37
To achieve this, agencies must cultivate three different stewardship
capacities. First, agencies must ensure basic procedural fairness, which creates a
baseline perception that institutional processes are fair and open. From there,
agencies must inculcate an internal culture of accessibility and responsiveness, so
that procedural fairness does not denigrate into rule-bound behavior that offers the
appearance of fairness while actually stifling the ability of regulators to respond to
individual citizens and groups. 238 Finally, agencies must cultivate a culture of
rigorous self-critique to ensure that assessments of agency decision-making do not
dwindle into play-acting but remain searching inquiries. Together these three
stewardship capacities go a long way toward building trust in agency decisions.
When decisional processes are perceived as legitimate, the trust generated
can carry agency decisionmakers across uncertainties that would otherwise derail
agency credibility. Creating decisional processes that are perceived as legitimate,
however, is no easy task.
In determining what constitutes legitimate process, there often seems to
be a disconnect between those making regulatory decisions and those affected by
the decisions-with a particularly large perceptual gap between the regulators and
the intended beneficiaries of human health and environmental regulation. There is
at least the perception that the regulators share the worldviews, interests, and
values of the regulated parties, rather than those of the regulation's intended
235.
See, e.g., Bach, supra note 188, at 309-14; Melish, supra note 198
(describing what such a system might look like).
236.
Zucker, supra note 74, at 54. The Danish Board of Technology offers a
model for this kind of participatory approach-with members appointed from a wide range
of constituents, the Board acts as an advisor to Parliament. See Act on the Danish Board of
Technology, No. 375 (June 14, 1995), available at http://www.tekno.dk/
subpage.php3?page=statisk/uk-act.php&toppic=aboutus&language--uk. For a first hand
account of participating in one such Board, see Casper Bruun Jensen, Citizen Projects and
Consensus-Buildingat the Danish Board of Technology: On Experiments in Democracy, 48
ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 221 (2005).

237.
Garfinkel's infamous breaching experiments underscore how basic these
constitutive assumptions of a common set of rules are within a society. See Garfinkel, supra
note 162. In some of these experiments, Garfinkel had students try to pay more than the
price for an item at a store, shop by taking items from the grocery carts of others, and by
changing the rules of tic-tac-toe mid-game. He used these experiments to demonstrate the
existence of an unspoken set of assumptions about the course of everyday interactions, what
he called a "common moral order of the facts of collective life." Id. at 242. His work
showed that disruption of these expectations caused extreme distress, anger, and anxiety. Id.
Indeed, Zucker, Schutz, Berger, and Luhmann were all influenced by Garfinkel's
demonstration of this point.
238.
Thomas, supra note 139, at 171.
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beneficiaries. The so-called revolving door between industry and government is
emblematic of this problem. Those selected to head regulatory agencies often
come from the industries they regulate and then return to those industries after
leaving the government. For example, President Bush appointed Philip A. Cooney
of the American Petroleum Institute as chief of staff of the White House Council
on Environmental Quality. After leaving that post under a cloud for altering
reports to downplay climate change, Mr. Cooney went to work for ExxonMobil.
Similarly, when David Lauriski became head of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, he promptly acted on a petition to water down worker protection
regulations-a petition submitted by his former employer Energy West Mining
Company. Upon leaving the government, Lauriski went to work for John T. Boyd
Co., a mining consultancy. 9 Other examples abound.24° When the stakes are high,
and the risks and benefits unknown, this level of self-interest on the part of
regulators, rather than building trust 6 la game theory, too readily bleeds into
suspicion, or at the extreme, into conspiracy theories, thereby making trust more
difficult.
Even more fundamentally, there is a growing body of empirical data that
one's perceptions of risk are shaped by one's cultural frame. Yale's Cultural
Cognition Project, for example, has persuasively demonstrated that individuals
process information about risk in a fashion that fits their cultural predispositions.241
For example, in the wake of the 2007 Virginia Tech shootings, Americans split,
largely along pre-existing political fault lines, over whether stronger gun control
measures could have prevented the tragedy or whether existing gun control laws
enabled the tragedy by making it difficult for students and teachers to defend
themselves.242 Surveys revealed that individuals of opposing viewpoints had drawn
opposing conclusions from the tragedy.243
Another example can be found in how different groups respond to the
suggestion that a reinvigorated nuclear energy program is needed to respond to
global warming. For those opposed to nuclear energy, the juxtaposition of the two
issues seems absurd; but to those in favor of the technology the linkage is
obvious.244 Thus, nuclear proponents accuse opponents of greenhouse gas
239.

Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Mines to Mountaintops:

Rewriting Coal Policy: Friends in the White House Come to Coal's Aid, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug.

9, 2004, at Al.
240.
For example, Open Secrets keeps a cumulative list of individuals it claims
have revolved between industry and regulatory agencies. Open Secrets, Revolving Door:
Top Agencies, http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=G (last visited Aug.
2, 2009). The list totals in the thousands.
241.
Dan M. Kahan, et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making
Sense of Progress in the American Culture War of Fact (Yale Law School, Public Law

Working Paper No. 154, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1017189. See also Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological
Aspects of Retributive Justice, 41 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1031193.

PSYCHOL.

40-42,

242.
Kahan et al., supra note 241, at 6-8.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. at 4 (reporting higher correlation with cultural cognition than with any
other individual characteristic in how people perceived the threat of global warming).
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hypocrisy, while opponents view this position as crass opportunism. Conflicting
values channel responses to a challenge that has more than one plausible solution.
Because neither side gives the other credit for presenting legitimate views, a lack
of trust compounds the difficulties of responding to this pressing global crisis.
These differing cultural assessments of risk have important ramifications
for regulatory trust. If it is true that one's value orientation predicts which risks
one takes more seriously, this offers a cogent explanation for why policy
antagonists so often appear to talk past one another rather than engage in a
dialogue.245 Because of their unique experiences, these groups tend to draw on
different knowledge stores and interpretive heuristics to process and interpret new
information. Different relevance structures and baseline assumptions lead them to
prioritize radically different pieces of information and thus to proceed down
markedly different analytical paths from the same starting point.
This insight about the cultural dimensions of risk perception forms part of
the social backdrop against which decisionmakers must act and adds another
dimension to the trust-building process-properly conceived, the regulatory task is
not only to bridge uncertainty gaps but also to bridge perceptual ones-and to do
so in a fashion that makes meaningful dialogue possible and promotes sound
decisions.
One advantage of analyzing agency actions through a stewardship lens is
that it foregrounds obstacles to regulatory trust that a more traditional expert-based
discourse obscures. For example, a robust stewardship analysis forces regulators to
confront the problem that certain communities' needs are not well-served by the
existing social order. Those who feel vulnerable or disadvantaged, for whatever
reason, tend to find it riskier to trust because they are less able to cope with ' the
247
246
consequences of misplaced trust. Mere "persistence of the moral social order
is not sufficient to create social trust in communities whose needs have historically
been shunted aside in the administrative process or who bear a disproportionate
share of public "bads. '248 For these communities, mere continuationof the existing
social order offers little reason to trust. Indeed, trust based on continuation of the
245.
For a description of how this phenomenon plays out in the World Bank
between economists and lawyers vis-A-vis human rights, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture
Matters in InternationalInstitutions: The Marginalityof Human Rights at the World Bank,

103 AM. J. INT'L. L. (forthcoming 2009).
246.
See, e.g., Paxton, supra note 108, at 42; Robert Wuthnow, The Foundations
of Trust, REP. FROM INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y, Summer 1989, at 8.
247.
BARBER, supra note 18, at 10-14.
248.
Gov't Accounting Office, Environmental Justice: Measurable Benchmarks
Needed to Gauge EPA Progress in Correcting Past Problems, GAO-07-1140T (July 25,

2007). Indeed, some argue that there is a somewhat invidious feedback loop between
socioeconomic status and social trust. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 188, at 308. These
scholars claim that social trust correlates with perceptions of economic security and other
resources like education. Because social trust creates positive feedback loops that make
collective action easier, these thinkers see trust reinscribing privilege, a process that then
creates a negative feedback loop deepening mistrust among outsider groups. Patterson,
supra note 88, at 196. See also Hardin, Street-Level Epistemology, supra note 62, at 508
(opining that "experience molds the psychology of trust").
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existing social order would require that they embrace the inequities that led to their
disadvantaged situation in the first place. 249 There is little prospect of such a result.
An inclusive vision of regulatory trust, one not limited to trust among those
already in a position of privilege, must account for these experiences.2 5 0 Thus, to
build and nurture social trust, pluralism, inclusion, and participation must be
central values in regulatory stewardship.
C. Transparency
It was none other than Louis Brandeis who wrote that "sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants. ' 25' It is certainly not novel to propose transparency as
a critical component of regulatory trust. Indeed, the core of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) consists of rules for public notice, participation, and
comment.25 2 The APA empowers citizens to interact with regulators through public
meetings and written submissions. These participatory rights are of vital
importance to the democratic legitimacy of administrative decision-making.
United States disclosure statutes like the Freedom of Information Act2 53 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 254 have been influential
around the world. Most of these statutes focus on providing information-they
leave the decision of how to use that information to individuals and the public as a
whole. Thanks to former Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government
Initiative, 255 a significant proportion of United States government information is
249.
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 531-32 (1997) (expressing

skepticism about the possibility of truly equal citizen participation in the face of vast
disparities of wealth in the private sector).
250.
Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered Participatory
Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED

3 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003). Susan Sturm
rightly points out that even when they recognize the need for expanded participation,
scholars are typically vague about the processes by which this will occur. Susan Sturm, The
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 247, 261-70 (2006). Rena Steinzor emphasizes the inappropriateness of
expecting individuals, especially marginalized individuals, to simply pick up the burdens of

participation rather than significantly changing society to make their successful
participation possible. Rena Steinzor, Myths of the Reinvented State, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 223
(2001). This Article merely begins the process of answering the question of what
meaningful public participation might entail. Much work still needs to be done to put flesh
on these bones.
251.
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914). This line is often
quoted, but its context is rarely remarked. Brandeis was writing about an unregulated
banking system run amok. The parallels to today's headlines are striking. As such, this
insight is as important today as it was ninety-five years ago.

252.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2006).

253.
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
254.
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (2000). In particular, the Toxic Release Inventory, 42 U.S.C. § 11023,
requires disclosure of toxic chemical releases and waste management practices of large
industrial facilities. EPA's TRI website can be found at http://www.epa.gov/TRI.
255.
See generally AL GORE, THE GORE REPORT ON REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
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readily available on the internet. Even this baseline vision of transparency rooted
256
in the principle of free access to government information is often under siege.
With all due respect, what I am proposing goes well beyond this rather
minimal conception of transparency as access to government information. The
APA only applies once an agency has settled on a proposed course of action.257
Citizens are routinely excluded from the earlier stages of the process-the forums
in which substantive drafting decisions are made, agendas are set, and decisionmaking rules are established.258 Moreover, while the procedures enshrined in
administrative decision-making welcome the public into an expert discourse, the
opportunity is effective only for those able to translate their concerns into language
that resonates within that discourse.
A robust conception of transparency must grapple not only with access to
government information but also with the equally significant issues of how and
whether information is communicated in a fashion that fully enables public
participation, 259 and who bears the costs associated with transparency. These latter
questions are particularly important for regulatory trust because transparency often
serves as a proxy for knowledge under conditions of uncertainty. In this capacity,
transparency offers an escape from the otherwise vicious cycle that the less
information we have, the more social and political trust we need, but the greater
the uncertainty, the more difficult to create and maintain that trust.

CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1993).

256.
Under Attorney General John Ashcroft, for example, the Department of
Justice indicated that it would support agency denials of access to information, a policy the
Obama Administration reversed its first day in office. See Memorandum from Attorney
General John Ashcroft to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.doi.gov/foia/new..attomey-generalmemo.html (overturned by
President Obama's Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/FreedomoflnformationAct/).
During the eight years of the Bush Administration, routine denial of Freedom of
Information Act requests became standard operating procedure at many federal agencies.
See Coal. of Journalists for Open Gov't, Still Waiting After All These Years, Aug. 8, 2007,
http://www.cjog.net/documents/StillWaiting-Narrative and Charts.pdf, Mike Doyle, Bush
v. FOIA, Jan. 23, 2009, http://washingtonbureau.typepad.com/law/2009/01/page/2/.
For an exploration of some of the other limitations of the APA transparency
257.
procedures, see Bach, supra note 188, at 294-99 (discussing contracting and adjudication);
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:
Globalization, Democracy and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.

397, 415-16 (1999) (exploring this topic in depth).

See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 13-15 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding
258.
that the APA does not limit ex parte contacts before a notice of proposed rulemaking has
been issued). The saga of the Cheney Energy Task Force underscores how important access
to that information can be.
259.
For an exploration of this question in the context of public education, see
Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy: Does Public
ParticipationMatter? 53 VILL. L. REv. 297, 319-25 (2008). More generally, see Seyla
Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 68-69 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996) (providing opinion on democratic process).
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Properly conceived, risk communication is not a one-way flow of
information from the expert to a public that receives and is transformed by the
information. Instead, risk communication is more of an iterative process of mutual
information sharing and priority identification. 260 This kind of communication
builds trust. That trust, in turn, can increase participants' willingness to share
information. When problems are ill-defined and possible alternatives are obscure
and unknown, this increased flow of information can make better and more
informed decisions possible. Thus transparency and trust have a reflexive
relationship. Trust increases the flow of information upon which decisions are
made. In turn, this enhanced transparency reinforces trust at those moments that it
would otherwise be most difficult to create and maintain. 261 Transparency thus
conceived serves as a proxy for knowledge under conditions of uncertainty.
For this reason, the familiar dismissal of many lay concerns as a
manifestation of the "NIMBY" syndrome may miss an important dimension of the
public discourse. The concerns that are raised are not only about risk but also
about which risks are given priority and at whose cost. This latter question is one
of legitimacy and social trust. Without trust that decisions will be made with
"scrupulous fairness and uncompromised commitment to the protection of the
public,

2 62

there is little reason for potential risk bearers to acquiesce when risks

are imposed on them. Certainly the lessons from environmental justice 263 teach us
that too often risks are concentrated in groups that bear little of the social benefit.
The process by which the federal government selected a Yucca Mountain,
Nevada site for a high-level radioactive waste depository exemplifies how a lack
of transparency compromises the regulatory trust necessary to give legitimacy to
260.
This conception of how risk communication occurs is intended to avoid the
"science as propaganda" hazard about which Paul Feyerabend has written, while still
leaving space for regulatory decision-making that values technical expertise. See PAUL
FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 73-76 (1978); Hardy et al., supra note 137, at 6972 (arguing that trust rests on reciprocal communication and does not involve
communication undertaken to sustain asymmetric power relationships).
261.
This contention finds empirical support in a recent study exploring the

relationship between trust in information provided by experts and risk perception with
regard to food choices. Mario Mazzocchi et al., Food Scares and Trust: A EuropeanStudy,
59 J. AGRIC. ECON. 2, 16 (2008) (finding that trust reduces risk perception). For an
interesting survey of citizen preferences with regard to public participation, see David L.

Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen
ParticipationProcesses:A Case Study of Citizens'Roles in Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement, 57 KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
262.
Kasperson et al., supra note 170, at 176.
263.
ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 1-10 (3d ed. 2000); COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST),
TOXIC WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SoCio-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
(1987), available at http://www.ucc.org/about-us/archives/pdfs/toxwrace87.pdf. For an

interesting exploration of this issue in the context of international law, see Hari Osofsky,
Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental
Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 88-94 (2005); see also Tseming Yang, The Form and
Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964for EnvironmentalRegulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 149-62 (2002).
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difficult regulatory decisions. Disposal of these wastes involves inherently large
uncertainties about health and environmental risks. The formidable technical
uncertainties involved in selecting the "first of its kind" repository site only
compounded those risks. 264 Under these conditions, public acceptance of any
selected site poses a major regulatory challenge. Unfortunately, rather than
confront this trust problem head on by creating opportunities for real public
participation in the decision-making process, the Department of Energy (DOE)
sought to mask the many uncertainties by relying on a unidirectional flow of
information under the rubric "public outreach., 265 Inadequate public participation,
coupled with perceptions of agency bias266 that flowed from close ties to industry,
and a poor track record with regard to handling these risks, hampered this process
at every turn. The public simply did not believe that DOE was willing to fully
engage with the nature and extent of the risks involved, nor did they believe that
DOE was committed to effectively mitigating those risks.267
For example, in a 1990 poll about siting the nuclear waste storage
repository at Yucca Mountain, only 29% of those surveyed agreed with a
statement that the federal government would be honest in the scientific research it
conducted to determine if nuclear waste could be safely stored at Yucca Mountain,
while 68% disagreed.26 s Even more troublingly, 52% expressed the belief that the

264.
Michael E. Kraft, Public and State Responses to High-Level Nuclear Waste
Disposal:Learningfrom Policy Failure,POL'Y STUD. REv., Winter 1991/92, at 152, 157-60
(arguing that agency secrecy and disregard of public participation compounded the

problems with identifying a disposal site for high-level nuclear wastes).
265.

Id. at 158-59; see also R.W. Riley, Nuclear Waste and Governance, in THE

POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WASTE x (E.W. Colglazier, Jr. ed., 1982) (quoting S. Carolina
Governor Riley as saying: "Of highest importance today is not only what is to be done but
also how we decide it is to be done. A process of decisionmaking must be established that
will allow us to have confidence in the results of that process. There will be remaining
uncertainties no matter what the decisions are. Only confidence in the process which leads
to those decisions will enable us, as a society, to live with those remaining uncertainties.").
266.
Dennis A. Bitz et al., Decision and System Analysis for Underground
Storage Tank Waste Retrieval Systems and Tank Waste Remediation System 45 (undated)
(reporting that the National Academy found DOE's methodology to be "unsatisfactory,
inadequate,
undocumented
and
biased"),
available
at
http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/l0196816-wuoH9f/webviewable/;
E.W.
Colglazier & R.B. Langum, Policy Conflicts in the Process for Siting Nuclear Waste
Repositories, 13 ANN. REv. ENERGY 317 (1988); Kraft, supra note 264, at 159-62;
10196816.pdf. For a full and somewhat more approving discussion of this methodology, see
Miley W. Merkhofer & Ralph L. Keeny, A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Alternative
Sites for the Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 7 RISK ANALYSIS 173 (1987); see also Letter from
Bd. on Radioactive Waste Mgmt. to Mr. Ben Rusche (April 26, 1985), reprinted in U.S.
Dept. of Energy, A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Sites Nominated for Characterization
for the First Radioactive Waste Depository-a Decision-Aiding Methodology (1986)
(describing the methodology employed by the agency as "unsatisfactory, inadequate,
undocumented and biased").
267.
DOE has a long record of ignoring health, safety, and environmental issues.
Indeed, cleaning up contaminated nuclear weapons sites that DOE administered has been a
three-decade-long project and counting.
268.
Kasperson et al., supra note 170, at 176.
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facility would be built at Yucca Mountain no matter what the research showed.269
These results reveal a lack of trust in the objectivity and intellectual honesty of the
decisionmakers and suggest a clear perception that the research process was an
attempt to drum up public support for an already crafted agenda, rather than a
genuine attempt at dialogue and shared agenda building. In fact, the Office of
Technology Assessment called the lack of public confidence in government the
"single greatest obstacle" to developing an effective waste-management scheme.27 °
Such a result is not inevitable. Sweden had significantly more success in siting a
similar facility, but only because its government processes were transparent and
welcomed maximum feasible participation from the affected communities.27' In
short, regulatory trust was essential to success.
The Yucca Mountain experience is unfortunately not unique. Too often,
parties with specific vested interests shape disclosure regimes in a fashion intended
to further those interests rather than promote regulatory transparency.272 This is yet
another way that, contrary to the strictures of game theory, self-interest
undermines rather than furthers social trust. For example, the Enron fiasco
prompted new disclosure rules for public companies.273 Yet, the 2008 financial
crisis brought home just how significantly those disclosure rules had been
manipulated.274
Although this problem garners far less attention, there is also a mismatch
between the purposes various parties ascribe to public participation. For
developers and purveyors of new technologies, public participation is primarily a
means to accomplish a specific end-approval of the technology. For members of
the public, participation may be an end in itself,275 a manifestation of democratic
269.
Id.
270.
U.S. Office of Tech. Assessment, Managing Commercial High-Level
Radioactive Wastes: Summary 31 (1982).
271.
Jane I. Dawson & Robert Darst, Siting Nuclear Waste Facilitiesin Western
Europe and the New Democracies of Central-Eastern Europe: The Centrality of
Transparency,
Trust,
and
Democracy
7-14
(2009),
available
at

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p-mla apa-research-citation/0/9/9/2/6/pages99260/p992
60-1.php.
272.
Kraft, supra note 264, at 163 (criticizing the agency nuclear repository site
selection process as more responsive to industry desires for rapidity than to the need for
thorough scientific and technical review).
273.

See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810

(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); see also David A. Westbrook,
Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv.
441,446-47.
274.
See Simon Bowers, Banking Crisis: US Regulators Plan Disclosure Rules
for Short Sellers, GUARDIAN, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/

business/2008/sep/18/marketurmoil.lehmanbrothers; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm.,
SEC Actions During Turmoil in Credit Markets, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/sec-actions.htm. The conventional rent-seeking explanations for this phenomenon are

well known. See, e.g.,

DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:

A

CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); see also Georg von Wangemheim, Self-Regulation as
Two-Stage Rent-Seeking, LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN L. & ECON. Ass'N ANN. PAPERS No.

060309-03 (2009), availableat http://repositories.cdlib.org/bple/alacde/060309-03.
275.
Kasperson et al., supra note 170, at 179.
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control over decision-making, 276 or even a means to an opposite end-rejecting the
technology. For agencies, participation is a time-consuming effort that often
impedes instrumental goals. 277 Perhaps these perspectives are to some extent
unavoidable, but developing some basic consensus about the purpose of public
participation as a collective exploration would be an important step in building
regulatory trust.
Another facet of this problem has to do with the costs of communication.
Time, attention, and resources must be expended in order to communicate
information, and, given the complex nature of the scientific information to be
communicated in many cases, adequate communication may involve more than
mere access to information. Particularly when new technologies are involved,
transparency might require active investment in the public's capacity to engage
more fully with the disclosed materials.
Such an approach requires the commitment of significant resources that
could otherwise be expended on other priorities. Should that investment be
financed by those seeking regulatory approval? This approach has the obvious
benefit of protecting the public fisc and fits well with the overall proof burdens
placed on those seeking regulatory approval.278 There are some obvious hurdles as
well. Regulated entities seeking approval for an activity or technology have an
incentive to keep their disclosures to a minimum and very little incentive to help
the broader public engage with the disclosed materials. This incentive structure
stems from both a reluctance to hand information to potential antagonists in the
general public and from the desire to protect intellectual property from potential
competitors. 27 9 A clear regulatory mandate that includes facilitating access and
capacity building as part of the regulatory process might help to overcome these
incentives toward secrecy and away from transparency. s°

276.
Although a discussion of deliberative democracy is beyond the scope of this
Article, there is an obvious overlap between the ideas I am proposing and theories of
deliberative democracy. Readers interested in the topic should start with JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs (William Rehg trans., 4th ed. 1998). For a
significantly more accessible survey of the relationship between participation and
democracy, see The Center for Deliberative Democracy, Results of a National Online
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When all of these pressures are considered together, it becomes clear that
real transparency requires more than the bare-bones disclosures required by
statute. Without deliberate agency intervention, the disclosures and information
exchange necessary for meaningful public participation in regulatory decisionmaking-the kind of participation necessary to build regulatory trust-is unlikely
to occur. Thus, it will take an affirmative commitment on the part of regulators to
develop this component of regulatory trust.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: USING REGULATORY TRUST
TO BUILD A MORE RESILIENT SOCIETY
Exploring the role that trust plays in regulatory systems inevitably
mediates the complex interrelationship between the economic and social fabric of
society as a whole and the individuals constituting that society. Regulatory trust
can help societies develop and nurture their resilient capacities, even in the face of
growing uncertainty. Recognizing this dynamic between trust and resilience may
offer a promising path for reshaping regulatory systems to respond to new
economic and technological challenges. That is why understanding how regulatory
trust is generated, and the factors that affect the durability of that trust is so
important for strengthening the institutions of modem society.
All of the ingredients that go into regulatory trust are interrelated.
Confidence in the general functioning of the system hinges on the possibility of
effective communication about the system and a belief in both capable external
oversight and in the system's internal reinforcement mechanisms. In turn,
communication enhances external and internal monitoring, which reinforces the
general functioning of the system as a whole.
When the system functions properly, regulatory trust can greatly enhance
a society's resilience in the face of uncertainty. But it takes sustained effort to
ensure that the processes sustaining regulatory trust do not dwindle into mere
recapitulation of existing power relationships or reinscription of pre-existing
political fault lines. This will require developing new ways of gathering and
assessing information, rearranging institutional decision-making processes, and
creating new focal points for accountability. Only through actively fostering these
efforts can we open a trusting space within regulatory decision-making, creating
the possibility for currently polarized constituencies to engage in genuine dialogue.
Adopting regulatory trust-supporting strategies can help create social stability in
the face of uncertainty.28'
The stakes are high. When citizens do not trust the regulatory systems
that purport to protect them, more than social trust is diminished-social resilience
suffers as well. Regulatory trust can increase resilience, but both trust and the
resilience it supports remain vulnerable-it is unfortunately easier to destroy
regulatory trust than to create it. This is why recent scandals about tainted cough
syrup produced and mismarked in China, revelations of suppressed evidence about

281.
Ruscio, supra note 174, at 640-41 (arguing that "political trust depends on
weaving together judgments of the integrity and capability of public officials with
confidence in the institutional structures in which they operate").
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the connection between Vioxx and heart attacks, or the failure of regulators to
discover Madoff's swindle in time to protect investors, are so corrosive. By
affecting all three of regulatory trust's components at once, these scandals weaken
society's reservoir of trust and dampen its overall resilience.282
Trust generation can be a lens for assessing how to renew and revitalize
social institutions. After all, the contours of the administrative structures inherited
from earlier times were created in response to specific needs: they are not an a
priori cultural given. The importance of this point cannot be overstated-there is
nothing magical or sacred about past (or current) configurations of administrative
processes. The regulatory toolkit must include an array of strategies that can be
deployed in different situations. Indeed, modem administrative decision-making
has already moved some distance from where this system began-for example,
decision-making now more explicitly acknowledges both the technocratic and the
political aspects of regulatory processes. While the underlying information may be
technical or scientific, the regulator makes political judgments when assessing that
information and prioritizing certain concerns and questions over others.283 Under
these circumstances, the legitimacy of agency decisions hinges on the three
dimensions of regulatory trust identified above--expertise, stewardship, and
transparency.
While scientific and technical questions centered on risk assessment and
risk management are an important element of regulatory decision-making, those
are not the only questions worth posing and answering. 284 The intertwined
regulatory trust framework of expertise, stewardship, and transparency surfaces the
fundamental social and ethical questions that otherwise tend to get overlooked. It
is precisely because problems of risk have "no unambiguous solutions but are
distinguished by a fundamental ambivalence, 285 that this kind of trust is so
important. Regulators must meet the challenge of balancing the unquestionable
benefits that scientific and technical advances offer with the new risks and
uncertainties they generate.286 Only regulatory trust has the potential to achieve
this balance. Thick relationships between individuals cannot overcome the inherent
uncertainty of the modem condition and instrumental rationality cannot provide
answers about which problems are worth solving first.
In building on these insights about the role that trust plays in regulatory
systems, two dimensions deserve particular attention. The first, more specific
dimension focuses on whether a particular regulatory regime is perceived as
meeting the concerns for protecting human health and the environment that drove
282.
These controversies also raise an important question of scale. Does one
actually trust the chemist or the doctor, or is it in fact medicine, science, or technology? See
LuHMANN, supra note 18, at 53 (posing this question).
283.
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WELLINGTON L. REV.363, 365 (2007) (noting that "a seemingly objective determination of
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risk").
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regulation in the first place. The second dimension is more global and assesses
whether implementing a regulation supports or undermines articulated social
values. This second dimension is constantly present in questions of how (or
whether) new technology can help advance toward the goal of a better society.
While lay risk appraisals are often posed as the polar opposite to "rational and
reasoned" expert judgments, this polarity is false. Building regulatory trust means
addressing both expert and lay concerns surrounding these new technologies. This
approach recognizes that the definition of the public good, rests, at least in part, on
the structural definitions and boundaries for interactions created by social trust and
the social meaning that is ascribed to regulatory decisions about risk.
A healthy society needs room for genuine dialogue, particularly over
issues of how to evaluate and weigh risks to public safety. When prospective risk
bearers harbor suspicion over the fairness of the regulatory process and doubt the
trustworthiness of those responsible for protecting them, conditions are ripe for
conflict and impasse. Research shows that the presence or absence of trust
dramatically affects communications about and perceptions of risk. The expanded
forms of stewardship, expertise, and transparency described in this Article will
help construct and maintain that trust. 2 87 This approach to regulation requires a
genuine commitment to continually reinforcing regulatory trust through enhanced
public participation, expansive appreciation of both conventional expertise and its
limits, and an open flow of information.288 Success on these fronts may be the
biggest predictor of public acceptance of new or controversial technologies.
When technological advances outpace science policy, the public often
finds itself trapped between ratifying post hoc the choices made by private actors
for private purposes, without public input, or rejecting those choices and being
labeled "backward" or "anti-progress" or "Luddite." This choice is a false one. The
goal of the regulatory state ought to be to engage with the public to create a shared
vision of social policy in which technological innovation can be evaluated and
assessed, rather than to try to drum up post hoc public support for an agenda
already established by private actors.
Attention to stewardship, transparency, and expertise, as I have described
them, might help transform this debate and help us move from public acrimony
toward mutual respect.289 Such movement is critical if we are to rise to the
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challenges posed by global warming, and in the process, it will also help weave a
tighter and more resilient social fabric.
One cannot "disprove" a deep unease with technological choices that
commodify nature or humans and a suspicion that developments are not taking
fundamental needs into account. Trust can bridge those concerns, but to build that
trust, one must acknowledge the factual grounding on which these perceptions rest
and must recognize that regulatory institutions simultaneously empower and
control. This requires a reimagining of the relationship between public and private
and a reconstitution of the ways in which we understand government to function.
In short, social trust in institutions is "not so much a choice between one course of
action (trusting) and another (distrusting), but between either accepting a given
level of assurance or looking for further controls and safeguards. 29 °
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